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THE JURISDICTION TO DO JUSTICE: FLORIDA'S JURY
OVERRIDE AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION*
MICHAEL MELLO**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This generation of ... lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity to
aid in the formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that
will protect the rights and liberties of our people, however the
philosophy of the United States Supreme Court may ebb and flow.
Vermont Supreme Court'

F

LORIDA is one of only three states that allows a judge to override a capital sentencing jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. 2 Florida is the only state that employs the override
*

Copyrighted 1991, Michael Mello. The meaning of the phrase "jurisdiction to do justice"

as used in this Article originated within the Florida Office of the Capital Collateral Representative in
the mid-1980's. The term captures the idea that the Florida Supreme Court invariably possesses the
power to do justice. This Article explores whether the court can, in good conscience, exercise that
jurisdiction to invalidate the jury override based on the state constitution.
** Associate Professor, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1979, Mary Washington College; J.D.,
1982, University of Virginia. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that between 1983 and 1986 I
was an assistant state public defender in Florida (first at the office of the Public Defender in West
Palm Beach, and later as a charter attorney with the office of the Capital Collateral Representative
in Tallahassee), where all of my clients were death row inmates. I was co-counsel for Joseph Spaziano in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld
the facial federal constitutionality of Florida's jury override, and lead counsel in Spaziano v. State,
489 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1986), in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the state constitutionality of
the override. I presently represent four condemned inmates, three of whom are on death row in
Florida.
I am grateful to Laura Gillen, who typed endless drafts of the manuscript, to my research assistants, Diane Campbell, Paul Cavanaugh, and Sharyn Grobman, who provided invaluable help with
this Article, and to Susan Apel and Elliot Scherker, who read and commented helpfully on the
manuscript. Michael Radelet graciously provided me with most of the statutory materials used in
section four.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Craig Barnard, lead counsel in Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984), friend, and, above all, mentor and teacher.
1. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 1985).
2. At least 26 jurisdictions with presumptively valid capital statutes allow a death sentence
only if the jury votes for death, unless the defendant has requested sentencing by the court. See
Federal: 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c) (1988); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 54-603 (Supp. 1989); California:
CAL. PENA. CoDE § 190.3 (West 1988); Colorado: Cow. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & Supp.
1990); Connecticut: CorN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (1985); Delaware: DE. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1987 & Supp. 1990); Georgia: GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to 17-10-32 (1990); Illinois: ILL. REv.
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frequently, despite the reality that Florida juries are among the most

STAT. ch. 38, 19-1 (1979 & Supp. 1990); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1990); Louisiana: LA. CODE CRim. PROC. ANN. art. 905.8 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1987 & Supp. 1990); New Hampshire: N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 (1986 & Supp. 1990); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990);
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1990); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(1983); Ohio: Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Baldwin 1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 701.11 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(f) (Purdon
1982); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); South Dakota:
S.D. CoDFED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1988); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp.
1990); Texas: Tax. CRm. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1990); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (1990); Washington:
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (1990); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1988). In Nevada the
jury is given responsibility for imposing the sentence in a capital case; if the jury cannot agree, a
panel of three judges may impose the sentence. N~v. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 175.554, 175.556 (Michie
1986).
In Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, the court alone imposes sentence. Amxz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1989); NEa.
REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1985). Interestingly, two justices of the Idaho Supreme Court assert that the
state constitution provides a right to jury sentencing in capital cases. E.g., State v. Creech, 670 P.2d
463, 477 (Idaho 1983) (Huntley, J., dissenting); id. at 487 (Bistline, J., dissenting); State v. Lankford, 474 P.2d 710, 726 (Idaho 1987) (Huntley, J., concurring), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S.
1051 (1988).
Only in Florida, Alabama, and Indiana do juries render non-binding recommendations of life or
death. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9
(1985 & Supp. 1990). The capital sentencing provisions of Kentucky and Ohio refer to the jury's
sentencing determination as a "recommendation." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1990) (the jury shall "recommend a sentence for the defendant") (emphasis added); Oino
RE. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D) (Baldwin 1987) ("If the trial jury recommends that the sentence of
death be imposed upon the offender, the court shall proceed to impose sentence pursuant to ... this
section.") (emphasis added). Under neither statute, however, is a trial judge authorized to increase a
life recommendation to a death sentence. In any event, jury overrides in either direction appear to be
virtually nonexistant. E.g., Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Ky. 1985) (Leibson, J.,
concurring) ("If the jury so recommends [death], almost without exception the trial judge has followed the jury's recommendation by imposing the death penalty"). Whereas the Ohio Supreme
Court has consistently refused to recognize the constitutional implications of its statutory provisions,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has reversed a death sentence where the prosecutor and trial judge
emphasized that the jury sentence was only a "recommendation." Compare State v. Steffen, 31
Ohio St. 3d 111, 509 N.E.2d 383 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 916 (1987) and State v. Williams, 23
Ohio St. 3d 16, 490 N.E.2d 906 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 923 (1987) with Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d at 408.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, United States legislatures have decided with near unanimity that
no person should be sentenced to die without the consent of her peers. In 1971 the Supreme Court
observed that "[e]xcept for four States that entirely abolished capital punishment in the middle of
the last century, every American jurisdiction has at some time authorized jury sentencing in capital
cases." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.lI (1971). The plurality in Woodson v. North
Carolina traced this history:
The inadequacy of distinguishing between murderers solely on the basis of legislative criteria narrowing the definition of the capital offense led the States to grant juries sentencing
discretion in capital cases. Tennessee in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in 1846, were the first States to abandon mandatory death sentences in favor of
discretionary death penalty statutes. This flexibility remedied the harshness of mandatory
statutes by permitting the jury to respond to mitigating factors by withholding the death

926

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:923

death-prone. 3 Between December 1972 (when the override statute
was enacted) and March 1988, 526 death sentences were imposed
under Florida's present-day capital statute. 4 Of these, 113 were life
recommendation overrides. 5 Thus, one in five people sentenced to
die in Florida had jury recommendations of life.
I have suggested elsewhere that the jury override violates the federal Constitution, 6 and Ruthann Robson and I have argued that regardless of its federal constitutionality the override should be
rejected by the legislature as poor public policy. 7 This Article explores whether the override offends the Florida constitution. 8
This topic may strike you as being an afterthought in light of my
earlier treatments of the override. Perhaps in a way it is. But the
fault lies more with my own myopia about the importance of state

constitutions than with the subject matter. 9 In Spaziano v. State0 in
1986, I briefed and argued to the Florida Supreme Court that the
override violates the state constitution. Because I did not take state
constitutions seriously in 1986, my presentation of this issue to the

penalty.... By 1963, all .

.

. jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty

statutes with discretionary jury sentencing.
428 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598-99
(1978); W. BowERS, EXECUTIONS iN AmEWCA 7-9 (1974).
3. A 1980 survey found that 23 states explicitly required jury unanimity to impose death, and
most of the remaining capital punishment states did so by implication. See Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 102-19 (1980). In Florida, a death recommendation requires only a
majority of the jury. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (Supp. 1990).
4. Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionalityof CapitalStatutes
That Divide Sentencing ResponsibilityBetween Judge and Jury, 30 B.C.L. REv. 283, 287 (1989). For
a discussion of Florida's modem death penalty statute, see infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
5. Id. Two Florida inmates (Ernest Dobbert and Buford White) have been executed notwithstanding jury recommendations of life. A third, Robert Francis, is scheduled to be executed on June
19, 1991.
6. Id.
7. Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in
CapitalCases, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 31 (1985).
8. For excellent general discussions of state constitutions and capital punishment, see H. BEDAU, DEATH iS DIFFERENT 185-194 (1987); Acker & Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under
State Constitutions,42 VAND. L. REV. 1299 (1989).
9. Courts have expressed frustration with lawyers' neglect of state constitutional arguments.
See Acker & Walsh, supra note 8, at 1314 n.85 (collecting examples). The Vermont Supreme Court
has suggested wryly that such neglect flirts with malpractice. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d. 233, 234 (Vt.
1985). "After Jewett was decided the Vermont Attorney General formed a special state constitutional law commission, specifically to research history and legal precedent relevant to the Vermont
Constitution." Acker & Walsh, supra note 8, at 1314 n.85. The Vermont Attorney General wrote in
1988 that "state attorneys general have formed a national clearinghouse to monitor, study, and
contribute to emerging state constitutional law." Amestoy, State ConstitutionalLaw An Attorney
General'sPerspective, 13 VT. L. REV. 337, 337 (1988).
10. 489 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1986).
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court was rushed, superficial, and artless-and it appeared near the
end of a brief in excess of 250 pages. The court summarily rejected
the claim. The totality of the court's opinion addressing the issue
consisted of a single sentence: "We also reject [Spaziano's] suggestion that we disregard the United States Supreme Court's determination that this state's jury override procedure is constitutional,"
and that we hold the procedure unconstitutional under the Florida
2
Constitution."
In the intervening five years since Spaziano v. State was decided, I
have come to take state constitutions deadly seriously. During that
five year period, events have transpired that require us all to take
state constitutions seriously. So think of this text as an out-of-time
request for rehearing in Spaziano v. State-half-a-decade out of
time, roughly. I want a second chance to explore the override's validity under the Florida constitution.
II.

THE JURY OVERRIDE IN FLORIDA

3

If [the trial judge] wasn't going to follow our sentencing verdict,
why did he ask us for our opinion in the first place?
4
A Florida capital juror
A.

The Jury Override Statute: In Theory

Florida's present day capital punishment statute was enacted in
1972 in the turbulent aftermath of Furman v. Georgia." In Furman,
a divided United States Supreme Court held that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment prohibited impo-

11. The court here cited Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), an earlier incarnation of
Joseph Spaziano's attempts to challenge his death sentence based on the jury override. In Spaziano,
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 42-50, the United States Supreme Court upheld the federal constitutionality of Florida's jury override.
12. Spaziano, 489 So. 2d at 721. The court here cited Echols v. State, 484 So. 2d 568 (Fla.
1985) and Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). The citations to
Echols and Porter were mysterious, as nothing in the reported opinions suggests that Echols or
Porter were challenging the jury override as unconstitutional under the Floridaconstitution. Both
cases involved run-of-the-mill challenges to the override based on prevailing Florida Supreme Court
override doctrine. See Echols, 484 So. 2d at 576-78; Porter,429 So. 2d at 296-97. That doctrine is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 70-8.
13, Portions of this section are distilled from Mello & Robson, supra note 7.
14. This quotation is from memory. I interviewed the juror in 1985, in connection with postconviction litigation on behalf of a condemned client. But the juror's remark-and, even a decade
after she sat as a juror in the case, the palpable anger behind the remark-have remained clearly in
my memory.
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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sition of the death penalty pursuant to statutes, such as Florida's,
which allowed juries uncontrolled discretion to impose death. Under
Florida's so-called "mercy statute" invalidated by Furman,'6 all defendants convicted of capital offenses were to be sentenced to death
unless the jury recommended mercy.' 7 A jury recommendation of
mercy was binding on the trial court.' s The statute made no attempt
to structure or guide the jury's process of deciding whether or not to
recommend mercy. Florida's capital punishment scheme had been a
mercy statute for the century ending in 1972 with Furman.'9
Florida's post-Furman death penalty statute attempts to structure
the capital punishment decision by establishing a procedure to be
followed in determining what penalty should be imposed upon a
conviction of first degree murder. 20 The statute provides that the
court shall, unless waived, conduct a separate sentencing proceeding
before the jury. 2 1 The jury renders an "advisory sentence" to the
court 22

The statutory language is clear that the jury's recommendation is
not binding: "Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority
of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances," enters a sentence of life or death. 23 If the jury recommends death, regardless of whether the judge sentences to life,
the court must set forth in writing its findings as to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. 2 4 Death sentences are subject to automatic
16. FiA. STAT. §§ 775.082(1), 921.141 (1971). Furman rendered these statutes unconstitutional.
E.g., Pitts v. Wainwright, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Anderson v. Florida, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); Newman
v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972); Reed v. State,
267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972); Chaney v. State, 267. So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
17. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1971).
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
20. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (Supp. 1990). In addition to authorizing death for aggravated murder,
the statute also permitted capital punishment for rape of a child under the age of eleven. The Florida
Supreme Court held the latter provision unconstitutional in Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
21.

FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1989).

22. Id. § 921.141(2). Although the statute speaks in terms of a recommendation by a "majority" of the jury, a split vote of 6-6 is treated as a recommendation of life imprisonment. See Patten
v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 980 (Fla. 1985); Rose v. State, 425 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 909 (1983).
23. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1989).
24. The statute requires written findings if the judge imposes death, regardless of whether the
jury recommended life or death. Id. § 921.141(3). The Florida Supreme Court has required, pursuant to its power to regulate practice and procedure, that judges imposing life sentences where the
jury has recommended death must also support the sentence by written findings. State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). In practice, however, courts seldom provide such findings.
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review by the Florida Supreme Court. 25
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of
Florida's post-Furman statute, including the jury override, in the
1973 case State v. Dixon.26 Applying reasoning that seems ironic in
light of the subsequent frequency of death sentences imposed by the
trial judge following jury recommendations of life imprisonment,
the court explained that "[tlo a layman [sic], no capital crime might
appear to be less than heinous .... ,,27Trial judges, "with experience in the facts of criminality[, possess] the requisite knowledge to
balance the facts of the case against . . . standard criminal activity ....

"28

Such knowledge "can only be developed by involve-

ment with the trials of numerous defendants. 2 9 In this way "the
inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man [sic] to
30
die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial experience."
Florida's jury override has received a substantial amount of attention from the United States Supreme Court. The Court discussed
the override briefly in 1976 in Proffitt v. Florida,3' and extensively
in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida.3 2 In June 1990 the Court granted
certiorari in Parker v. Dugger.3 3 The first of five questions presented in Parker was whether "the application of Florida's jury
over-ride standard in an individual case [is) subject to an Eighth
Amendment review, and, if so, what standard of review is applicable?" ' 34 Parker was decided on January 22, 1991, 35 and the Court
invalidated the death sentence, reversed, and remanded on narrow
factual grounds. The first question presented was never directly ad-

dressed

36

25. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1989). See generally D. PANNicK, JUDICIAL REvIE OF
DF TH
PEILTY (1982); Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 Gao. L.J. 97, 123-41
(1981); Goodpaster, JudicialReview of Death Sentences, 74 J. Cam. L. & CSWaNou-w 786 (1983);
Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals, 74 J. C-'gs. L. &
CRaNoooy 913 (1983).
26. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).

27. Id.at 8.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

428 U.S. 242 (1976).
468 U.S. 447 (1984).
110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990) (order granting certiorari).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Parker v. Dugger, No. 89-5961 (U.S. 1990).
111 S. Ct. 731 (1991).
Writing for the five-vote majority (Justices Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, and

Souter), Justice O'Connor called attention to the Florida Supreme Court's review of the factors
upon which the trial judge relied in overriding the jury recommendation of life. Id. at 736. On direct
appeal the Florida Supreme Court had eliminated two aggravating factors as found by the trial
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The Supreme Court first encountered the override in Proffitt v.
Floridain 1976,' 7 holding that as a whole Florida's then-new capital
statute sufficiently guided the sentencer's discretion and satisfied

the concerns articulated in Furman. The condemned petitioner in
Proffitt, whose jury had recommended death,3 8 argued to the Court
that "[t]he jury's advisory sentencing verdict introduces unnecessary discretion into the sentencing procedure because the statute
gives no guidance regarding its relevance. The verdict is merely an
enigmatic statement that the jury recommended life or death. The
basis for the recommendation need not be given." 3 9 The Supreme
Court did not agree that the override injected arbitrary discretion
into Florida's capital punishment scheme. The Court relied upon
and quoted from the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Tedder v.
State ° in reasoning that "in order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ." '4'

judge, but the court had upheld the override based upon a determination that the trial judge had
found "no mitigating factors to balance against the aggravating factors." Id. at 738 (quoting the
Florida Supreme Court's decision on direct appeal, Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1984)).
The Supreme Court held that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court erred in its characterization of the trial
judge's findings," id., and wrote that although the trial judge did not find any statutory mitigating
factors, he must have "found and weighed non-statutory mitigating circumstances before sentencing
Parker to death." Id. (emphasis added). Because Parker was entitled either to have these non-statutory mitigating factors considered with the remaining aggravating factors, or at the very least to a
harmless error analysis, and because the Florida Supreme Court had engaged in neither, the "affirmance was invalid because it deprived Parker of the individualized treatment to which he is entitled
under the [eighth amendment to the] Constitution." Id. at 740.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Kennedy, and Scalia, took issue
with the majority's perceived second-guessing of the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 740 (White, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters criticized the majority for resting the entirety of their opinion on "a reconstruction of the record the likes of which has rarely, if ever, been performed before this Court."
Id. at 741.
The factual bickerings of the Court, while accurately reflecting the deep and incongruous lines of
allegiance in death penalty litigation, do little to further our understanding of the eighth amendment's application in individual override cases. The Court seemingly approved the application of the
eighth amendment in individual override cases, but did nothing to explain the bounds of this holding. See id. (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court ultimately concludes that Parker was deprived of
"meaningful appellate review" which, for reasons not fully explained, apparently entitles him to
relief under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.").
37. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
38. Id. at 246.
39. Brief for Petitioner at 63-64, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See also Brief for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, at 37-40, 46-47.
40. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
41. 428 U.S. at 249.
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The Supreme Court explicitly examined and upheld the facial con42
stitutionality of the override in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida. Joseph Spaziano argued that death is a qualitatively different kind of
punishment from any other, in part because its justification in an
individual case is essentially and uniquely retributive. Because the
death penalty is society's expression of outrage, juries rather than
judges are more likely to rank reliably the offender and his or her
offense on the yardstick of community anger. 43 As evidence of this
proposition, Spaziano surveyed the overwhelming rejection in this
country of judge sentencing in capital cases, while noting that judicial sentencing in noncapital cases is all but universal.
The Court rejected this facial attack for two reasons. First, the
Court found that as a matter of federal constitutional law retribution is not the sole justification for imposing death in individual
cases: Deterrence and incapacitation also have roles." Second, the
Court reasoned that even if one assumes that retribution is what sets
capital sentencing apart from other punishments, it does not follow
that jury sentencing is required. "Imposing the sentence in individual cases is not the sole or even the primary vehicle through which
the community's voice can be expressed ....
The community's
voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when the death
penalty is authorized . . . ,,41 This insight permitted the Court to
acknowledge yet trivialize the facts that most states have jury sentencing in capital cases and that in most states a jury verdict of life
imprisonment is binding. The Court concluded that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion
different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer
'
its criminal laws." 4
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from the majority's treatment of the jury override issue. The
dissent argued that juries as an institution are best able to determine
reliably whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment
in a specific case:

42. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
43. Id. at 461. See also Gillers, supra note 3, at 47-59.
44. 468 U.S. at 461-62.
45. Id. at 462.
46. Id. at 464. The Court also rejected Spaziano's two other jury override arguments. First, the
Court held that the override does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Id.
at 465. Second, the Court found that the override had not been applied in Spaziano's cases in an
arbitrary or capricious manner and therefore did not violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 467.
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Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a
rule of law as judges normally understand such rules, but rather is
ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's
outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement
to live-I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response
can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is
made by a jury rather than by a single governmental official. This
conviction is consistent with the judgment of history and the
current consensus of opinion that juries are better equipped than
judges to make capital sentencing decisions. The basic explanation
for that consensus lies in the fact that the question whether a
sentence of death is excessive in the particular circumstances of
any case is one that must be answered by the decisionmaker that is
best able to "express the conscience
of the community on the
' ' 47
ultimate question of life or death.
Stevens also pointed out that Florida's stated reasons for the
override counseled against its validity. The override was enacted
during the pervasive confusion following Furman v. Georgia's invalidation of all existing death statutes.4 8 At that time no one knew
for certain whether a constitutional capital punishment scheme was
even possible. "A legislative choice that is predicated on this sort of
misunderstanding is not entitled to the same presumption of validity
as one that rests wholly on a legislative assessment of sound policy
and community sentiment." 49 Stevens also took issue with the majority's conclusion that judges possess special expertise in sentencing, reasoning that while this may be true of noncapital sentencing,
it is not the case in capital sentencing because "the death penalty is
unique ....
The decision whether or not an individual must die is
not one that has traditionally been entrusted to judges." 5
In retrospect it becomes plain that Spaziano v. Florida was an
early manifestation of the Court's determination to "deregulate
death," as one commentator 51 aptly put it-generally to leave it to
the states to administer their capital statutes as they see fit. After
fifteen years of angst and fragmentation on the Supreme Court over

47. Id. at 469-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Witherspoon v
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)) (footnote omitted).
48. See Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman:An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. Cim. L. & Cmmoxooy 10 (1973); Meilo & Robson, supra note 7, at 68-70; Note,
Florida'sLegislative and Judicial Responses to Furman v. Georgia, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv 108 (1974).
See also infra notes 55-59.
49. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 476.
51. Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. Ray. 305.
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capital punishment, a stable consensus seems to have emerged
among the Justices:5 2 the Court should be "going out of the business of telling the states how to administer the death penalty . . . ."" In 1971 the Court held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment did not mandate standards to guide capital sentencers' discretion.5 4 One year later the Court held in Furman
v. Georgia" that the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause did require such standards.5 6 Then, in 1976, in Gregg

52. This consensus may be solidified further by the recent retirement of Justice Brennan. Interestingly, however, Justice Souter provided the decisive fifth vote in Parker v. Dugger, discussed
supra note 36.
53. Weisberg, supra note 51, at 305.
54. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman contains a brief per cur/am which holds that "the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40. Five justices wrote separately
to explain their reasons for concurring in the judgment.
Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan relied primarily on the eighth amendment, stating that "[t]he calculated killing of a
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity."
Id. at 290. Justice Marshall took a broader view of both the history behind the eighth amendment
and the discriminatory effect of the death penalty as applied. Id. at 364.
Justice Douglas stated that the death penalty as then applied violated both the eighth amendment
and, particularly, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. "[These discretionary
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in
the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. at 256-57. He did not reach the issue of whether a
mandatory death penalty would be constitutional. Id. at 257.
Justice Stewart relied upon the equal protection clause by offering this memorable line: "These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual." Id. at 309.
Justice White was disturbed by the infrequency of the imposition and execution of the death

penalty.
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the dictionary
sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve.
At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging
question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and
needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 312.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, dissented, relying
upon the history of the adoption of the eighth amendment and the stare decisi value of McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which held that judicially-articulated standards were not needed
to ensure a responsible capital sentencing decision. Those who joined in this dissent also wrote separately.
56. The effect of Furman was to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as then administered
in the United States. In response, the states enacted two kinds of capital punishment statutes: mandatory statutes requiring the death penalty for certain classes of crimes, and guided-discretion sta-
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v. Georgia" and its companion cases, the Court approved the
standards adopted in Georgia, Florida, 5 and Texas.19 In 1978,
despite Justice Rehnquist's charge that the Court was going
from "pillar to post,"0 and despite Chief Justice Burger's recognition that the Court's death penalty decisions were far from
consistent,6 ' the Court held that the capital sentencer must be permitted to consider any relevant evidence proffered in mitigation,6 2 a
notion reaffirmed in subsequent cases. 63 The Court has since finetuned the capital system it approved in 1976, sometimes vacating
death sentences" and, more frequently since the 1982 Term,6 5

tutes calling for comparison of specified aggravating and mitigating factors. In 1976, the Court held
mandatory capital punishment statutes unconstitutional, except in the most extraordinary situations.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
57. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). .
58. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
59. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
60. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
61. Id. at 597-602 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
62. See id. at 604-05 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (holding that although individualized sentencing
was matter of public policy in noncapital cases, individualized sentencing-including consideration
of all relevant mitigating factors-is constitutionally required for the "profoundly different" sentence of death).
63. For examples of Supreme Court decisions vacating death sentences because the sentencer
was precluded from considering mitigating factors, see Sumr v. Shumann, 483 U.S. 66 (1987);
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
64. E.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct 1227 (1990) (unanimity requirement held unconstitutional limitation on consideration of mitigating evidence); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578
(1988) (sentencer's consideration of invalid prior conviction); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987) (use of victim impact statement, including family's emotional reaction to and characterization
of murderer and his crime); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (mere cursory review used to
determine inmate's mental competency to be executed); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)
(prosecutor's comments to jury indicating that appeals court would correct any errors by jury); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death sentence for felony murder when defendant did not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place or lethal force be used); Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (state's request for death penalty on retrial violated double jeopardy
clause when jury had previously imposed lesser sentence); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)
(no showing of "consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder" when victims were killed immediately, defendant suffered extreme emotional distress as a result
of their deaths, and defendant admitted responsibility shortly after crimes); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (limitation on sentencer's consideration of mitigating factors); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence for crime of rape of an
adult woman).
65. In all but one of the 15 fully argued capital cases decided between 1976 and the end of the
1981 Term, the Court reversed or vacated the death sentence. Weisberg, supra note 51, at 305 n.l.
The Court rendered four capital cases at the end of the 1982 Term, all of which found against the
condemned inmate. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (rejecting challenge that jury instruction that governor may commute life sentence without parole was speculative or impermissibly
shifts focus from defendant); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (finding no constitutional
violation in sentencer's consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances); Barefoot v. Es-
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upholding them.66
The "deregulation" of capital punishment by the Supreme Court
must be considered as a piece with the Court's increasingly restrictive view of habeas corpus. In its procedural default decisions, 67 and
most recently in its retroactivity cases and successive habeas petition
cases,68 the Court has curtailed the availability of the writ radically.

telle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding procedures for expedited consideration of capital habeas cases
and allowing use of psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness at capital sentencing proceeding
even when based on hypothetical questions concerning particular defendant); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that invalidity of one aggravating circumstance did not render death sentence unconstitutional when other valid aggravating factors are present). See generally W. Wmra,
LE iN THE BALANCE (1984); Geimer, Death at Any Cost, 12 FiA. ST. U.L. REv. 737 (1985); Special
Project, CapitalPunishment in 1984, 69 CoRumn L. REv. 1129 (1984); Note, Dark Year on Death
Row: Guiding Sentencing Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 689
(1984).
66. For examples of cases decided subsequent to 1983 when the Supreme Court has upheld
imposition of the death penalty, see McCleskey v. Zant, No. 89-7024 (U.S. April 16, 1991); Blystone
v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990) (upholding Pennsylvania's capital statute); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990); Dugger v. Adams, 489
U.S. 401 (1989); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (no double jeopardy bar to reprosecution
for first degree murder when defendant breached plea bargain to second degree murder); McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (no constitutional violation on showing of statistical disparity between
imposition of death penalty in cases of black defendants with white victims and cases of white defendants with black victims); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding death sentence resting
on felony murder conviction on showing of "major participation" in felony and "reckless indifference to human life"); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (affirming death sentence following
instruction that jury should not be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling," because jury would not single out "sympathy" and would
likely consider instruction an admonishment not to consider sympathy arising from other than aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1987) (refusing to
grant relief on procedurally defaulted constitutional claim); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168
(1986) (finding no constitutional violation in exclusion of juror who would categorically refuse to
impose death penalty or in prosecutor's improper closing arguments); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986) (no constitutional error in removal of jurors who would not impose death sentence under
any circumstances); Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) (no double jeopardy bar to further
capital sentencing proceedings when appeals court finds evidence insufficient to support sole aggravating factor on which sentencing judge relied but not insufficient to support death sentence because
judge misconstrued availability of another aggravating factor); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82
(1985) (no double jeopardy bar to prosecution when defendant is tried for murder by one sovereign
(Alabama) after having pled guilty to an offense arising from same occurrence in prosecution by
another sovereign (Georgia)); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (jury instructional error
treated as harmless because jury's sentencing recommendation is given no deference whatsoever);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (no constitutional violation in exclusion of juror who
would not vote for death penalty regardless of circumstances of crime); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984) (no eighth amendment violation when judge sentences defendant to death despite
jury's recommendation of life sentence); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (no eighth amendment
requirement that states conduct proportionality review in capital cases).
67. E.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
68. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, No. 89-7024 (U.S. April 16, 1991); Butler v. McKeiler, 110 S. Ct.
1212 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v.
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Congress is poised to go even further.69
B.

The Jury Override Statute: In Practice

The jury override's actual implementation has been described elsewhere, 70 but one aspect of such application merits reiteration and update. In the past, the override has been inefficient. Between two-thirds
and three-quarters of life recommendation overrides were reversed on
appeal. 7' This phenomenon remains true today, only more so.
In 1975 the Florida Supreme Court held in Tedder v. State72 that
jury overrides would be affirmed on appeal only if "virtually no reasonable person could differ" that death should be imposed in the
case. Tedder has become the cornerstone of the Florida Supreme
Court's override doctrine.7 3

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). On retroactivity, see generally Arkin, The Prisoner'sDilemma: Life in the Lower CourtsAfter Teague v. Lane, N.C.L.
REv. (1991); Blume & Pratt, UnderstandingTeague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc.
CHANGE
-_ (1991); Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. Rav.
L. & Soc. CHNE (1991); Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas CorpusJurisdictionin Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
(1991); Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANG
(1991); Hoffman, The Supreme Court'sNew Vision of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
1989 Sup. CT. REv. 165; Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. ChuM. L. & CswotrioLooY 9
(1990).
69. E.g., S. 635, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess. (1991); H. Rep. 1400, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess. (1991); S.
REP. No. 1760, CoNG. REc. Oct. 16, 1989; Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CAm. L.
REP. 3239 (1989). For outstanding critiques of these proposals to "reform" habeas, see Robbins,
Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association'sRecommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materialsfrom the American Bar Association CriminalJustice Section's Project on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 53 (1990); Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice
Denied-A Comment on Recent Proposalsto Reform Death PenaltyHabeas Corpus, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 1665 (1990).
70. Mello, supra note 4; Mello & Robson, supra note 7; Radelet, Rejecting the Jury, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. Ray. 1485 (1985). Radelet's article is an outstanding treatment of the jury override issues.
71. Radelet, supra note 70, at 1422; see also Mello, supra note 4, at 290; Mello & Robson,
supra note 7, at 52-55.
72. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
73. It is fair to say that for the most part "[iln the years since [Tedder was decided, the court
has] not wavered from the Tedder test and [has] consistently applied it to the facts and circumstances
of cases on review where the trial judge has overridden a jury recommendation of fife imprisonment
and imposed the death penalty." Thompson v. State, 456 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. 1984). Though the
court occasionally uses what apparently is shorthand in expressing the Tedder test, e.g., Barfield v.
State, 402 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1981); Neary v. State, 384 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 1980); Burch v.
State, 343 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1977), and sometimes does not cite Tedder when considering an
override case, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 250 n.7, the vast majority of the cases explicitly
apply Tedder.
Alabama and Indiana, the only other states where the capital sentencing jury's recommendation is
expressly nonbinding, do not articulate a similarly strict standard in reviewing jury overrides. See
MeUo, supra note 4, at 289-90. In Alabama the trial judge need only "consider" the jury's sentenc-
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The Tedder standard is enforced rigorously by the Florida Supreme
Court. As Table 1 shows, over the decade-and-a-half life span of Florida's post-Furman statute, life recommendation overrides have been
reversed in seventy-four percent of the cases.
C
TABLE 174

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990 (to May)

Direct Appeal Decisions
Number
on Life
Recommendations
Affirmed
1
0
6
2
6
2
6
2
2
0
3
0
4
1
15
4
9
3
10
1
9
6
9
6
7
0
5
0
10
1
1
7
0
3

Percentage
Affirmed
0%
33%
33%
33%
0%
0%
25%
27%
33%
10%
67%
67%
0%
0%
10%
14%
0%

26%
These figures become even more significant when sorted into three
time frames. From 1974 (when the first override case reached the Florida Supreme Court) until the end of 1983 (just before certiorari review
was granted in Spaziano v. Florida), sixteen of sixty-two life overrides
were affirmed. In 1984 and 1985-during the pendency of Spaziano v.
Florida in the United States Supreme Court and the year after Spaziano was decided-affirmances by the Florida court were significantly more frequent: twelve of eighteen (66.7%). But from 1986
through May 1990, only two of thirty-two (6.25%) were affirmed.
TOTALS

ing recommendation. See ALA. CoDE § 13A-5-47(e) (1981); Jones v. State, 456 So. 2d 380, 382 (Ala.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985); see also Jones v. Alabama, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985) (Marshall
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Indiana statute contains a substantively identical provision. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(eX2) (Burns 1985). However, in practice the jury's recommendation does matter in Alabama and Indiana. See Mello, supra note 4, at 311-14.
74. Source: Letter from Dr. Michael Radelet, Professor of Sociology, University of Florida, to
Michael Mello, June 13, 1990, at I (copy on file with author). Radelet is the most reliable collector
of data on the jury override. E.g., Radelet, supra note 70.
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Over the past half decade, in other words, overrides have been reversed in more than ninety-three percent of the relevant cases. Jury
overrides of life recommendations have survived appellate review in
less than seven percent of the cases.
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that the Tedder standard is rigorous, and that it has become more so in the years since
Spaziano v. Florida was decided. Citing figures somewhat (but not
materially) different from the numbers cited in this Article, the court
in Cochran v. State' reiterated Justice Shaw's earlier statements 76 that
"during 1984-85, we affirmed on direct appeal trial judge overrides in
11 of 15 cases, 73%. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987 we have affirmed overrides in only 2 of 11 cases, less than 20%."' 7 This "current
reversal rate of over 800o is a strong indicator to [trial] judges that
they should place less reliance on their independent weighing of aggravation and mitigation."17 A jury's verdict for life means life, save in
the rarest of cases.
Thus, experience has not ameliorated the problems of applying the
override. To the contrary, as time has gone by the override's reversal
rate, always high, has become significantly higher. In the vernacular
of the Florida legislature, something is broken here. The question is
how to fix it. And by whom.
C.

Solutions

The jury override-conceived in an absolutely reasonable misapprehension of Furman'sethereal requirements" and applied in a way that
expends enormous judicial resources with minuscule net gain-has
been a dismal failure. Spaziano v. Floridaand the "deregulation" of
death evinced by that opinion strongly suggest that the federal courts
are unlikely to intervene to solve Florida's problem with the override.
The question becomes what is to be done. The initial answer is that
Florida must find its own solution. One possibility is legislative reform. In fact my experience testifying before the Florida legislature in
1984 and 1985 left me convinced that the lawmakers do not like the
override and would never enact it today in the first instance. How-

75. 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989).
76. Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988).
77. Cochran, 457 So. 2d at 933. According to Radelet, during 1984-85 the court affirmed 12 of
18 override cases; during 1986-87 the court affirmed zero of 12 overrides. Radelet, supra note 74.
The difference is of little moment. The clear reality is that in the years following Spaziano v. Florida
the Florida Supreme Court seldom affirms jury overrides.

78. Id.
79. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Mello &
Robson, supra note 7.
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ever, the politics of death in Florida make legislative reform of the
override unlikely.8° Legislation has been proposed repeatedly to repeal
the override. For example, in the 1984 legislative session the House
Committee on Criminal Justice held hearings on a bill which proposed
amending the capital statute to render a jury's recommendation of a
life sentence binding on the judge; a jury's vote for death would have
remained subject to the override. 81 The committee voted ten to seven
to strike the bill's enacting clause, thus foreclosing consideration of
the proposed legislation.82 Override repeal legislation was also unsuc8a
cessfully introduced in the 1985 legislative session.
The federal courts are now out of the business of regulating states'
systems of capital punishment. To judge by history, the Florida legislature is too timid. That leaves the state constitution and the Florida
Supreme Court. As the following sections suggest, existing Florida

80. But perhaps not. Florida Governor Lawton Chiles, who took office in January 1991, was
quoted recently as advocating repeal of the override: "I thing we'd be better," Chiles reportedly
said, "if we did away with the override." McGarrahan, State Ponders Changing Steps to Execution,
Miami Herald, March 3, 1991, at 6B. This view did not prevent Chiles from signing a death warrant
on Robert Francis, whose jury recommended life and who is scheduled to be executed on June 19,
1991.
81. Fla. HB 820 (1984). The bill would have amended the statute to provide that "[iln the event
the recommendation of the majority of the jury is that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, the court shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment." Id.
82. Mello & Robson, supra note 7.
83. Fla. HB 273 (1985); Fla. SB 940 (1985). Senate Bill 940 was sponsored by nineteen other
senators-enough virtually to ensure passage. The bill provided that in capital cases involving offenses committed after January 1, 1986, if "the recommendation of the majority of the jury is that the
defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, the court shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment."
Id. The bill was assigned to the Senate Corrections, Judiciary-Criminal, and Appropriations Committees. The Judiciary Committee, following hearings, voted in favor of the bill by a vote of 5-2,
and the Corrections Committee did the same by a vote of 3-2. Because passage of similar legislation
by the Florida House of Representatives appeared unlikely, no action was taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee or by the full Senate.
84. See generally Acker & Walsh, supra note 8. California and Massachusetts provide interesting case studies. The California Supreme Court found the death penalty in California unconstitutional in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972), decided while Furman was pending in the United States Supreme Court. In Anderson,
the court found it significant that the state constitution used the disjunctive "or" in the prohibition
of cruel or unusual punishment in article I, section 6 of the California constitution. Accord FLA.
CoNsr. art. I, § 17 (prescribing cruel or unusual punishment). Relying on its state constitutional
history, the California court found that when the constitution was first adopted the drafters were
well aware of the significance of the disjunctive form and its use. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d at 634, 493
P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155. Furthermore, the provision survived intact through the constitution's revisions to the modem day. Id. at 641, 493 P.2d at 887, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
The court held that the death penalty was cruel in the constitutional sense. Id. at 645, 493 P.2d at
891, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 163. The court found that it was
not concerned only with the "mere extinguishment of life," which the United States Supreme Court has suggested does not violate the Eighth Amendment, or with a particular
method of execution, but with the total impact of capital punishment, from the pro-
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constitutional doctrine provides a foundation for holding the override

nouncement of the judgment of death through the execution itself, both on the individual
and on the society which sanctions its use.
Id. at 646, 493 P.2d at 892, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (citations omitted).
Reasoning that the standards of society are not static, the court concluded that the meaning of
cruelty had to be construed in accordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 647, 493
P.2d 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The court found that public opinion polls, and the number of states
with death penalty statutes or other means which reflect public acceptance of capital punishment,
were not controlling factors in assessing contemporary standards of decency. Id. The infrequency of
the death penalty's application controlled. Id. at 648, 493 P.2d 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 166. The court
adopted the findings of one report which stated "all available data indicated that judges, juries, and
governors are becoming increasingly reluctant to impose, or authorize the carrying out of a death
sentence ....
In a few states in which the penalty exists on the statute books, there has not been an
execution in decades." Id. (quoting President'sCommission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: Report 143 (1967)). On Anderson generally, see Barrett, Anderson and the Judicial
Function, 45 S. CAL. L. Rv. 739 (1972); Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 750 (1972).
After the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman, the people of California amended by
referendum the state constitution to permit capital punishment. See M. ML-zNRR, CRuEL AND UNUsuAL: TIE SuPaaa CoURT AND CAPIrAL PuNismntmN 306 (1973). The California legislature passed a
mandatory death penalty statute in 1973 in an attempt to comply with Furman. See The California
Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 2 BEtcimAx 143 (1986). In 1976, however, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated the use of mandatory death sentences which did not allow the
consideration of mitigating circumstances. See supra note 56. The California Supreme Court, following the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, found the California death penalty statute
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution. In Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Ca.3d
420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976), the court found the statute unconstitutional because
"no guidelines [had) been provided by the Legislature upon which to weigh mitigating circumstances
against the aggravating factors which permit imposition of the death penalty .... "Id. at 441, 556
P.2d at 1113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 663. Therefore the reviewing court would not have been able to
determine whether the death penalty was excessive for this particular case, disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar cases, or a product of "passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." Id.
at 441, 556 P.2d at 1114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 212
(1976)).
The public responded with a 1978 initiative. The 1978 initiative amended the California Penal
Code to provide for the death penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of parole under certain listed circumstances. The statute appears to be constitutional. Cf. Boyde v. California, 110 S.
Ct. 1190(1990).
However, the California Supreme Court frequently invalidated death sentences in individual cases,
often grounding its decisions in state constitutional doctrine. California Supreme Court justices paid
a political price for their votes in cases vacating death sentences. Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin were in 1986 denied reconfirmation by California
voters, in no small measure due to their "activism" in using the state constitution to invalidate death
sentences. See generally Culver & World, Rose Bird and the Politicsof JudicialAccountability in
California,70 JUDICATURE 81, 86 (1986); Tabak, The Death of Fairness,14 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc.
CHAuoa 797, 847 (1986); Utter, State ConstitutionalLaw, The United States Supreme Court, and
DemocraticAccountability, 64 WAsH. L. Rav. 19, 41-42 (1989); Velman, Supreme Court Retention
Elections in California,28 SANTA CLARA L. Ray. 333 (1988).
Massachusetts provides an instructive comparison. The highest court of Massachusetts found the
state's death penalty cruel and unusual punishment under article 26 of the Declaration of Rights of
the Massachusetts Constitution. In DistrictAttorney for Suffolk District v. Watson, the court declared the death penalty to be unacceptable under contemporary moral standards. 381 Mass. 648,
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unconstitutional.

661-62, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1281 (1980). The court found:
The complete absence of executions in the Commonwealth through these many years indicates that in the opinion of those several Governors and others who bore the responsibility for administering the death penalty provisions and who had the most immediate
appreciation of the death sentence, it was unacceptable.
Id. at 662, 411 N.E.2d at 1282. The court also determined that the finality of the death penalty could
frustrate justice in that there could be no relief for the executed if later developments in law or
evidence occurred. Id. In addition, the state's act was a denial of the executed person's humanity. Id.
at 663-64, 411 N.E.2d at 1283. Finally, the court reasoned that the death penalty was arbitrarily
inflicted. Id.
What is of most interest in this opinion is the court's pronouncement that a legislative effort to
pass a death penalty statute which complied with the principles underlying Furman would nevertheless be unconstitutional. The court reasoned:
The Federal constitutional requirements are a constraint only upon certain aspects of jury
discretion. Furman and subsequent cases do not address the discretionary powers exercised at other points in the criminal justice process. Power to decide rests not only in
juries but in police officers, prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges. In the totality
of the process, most life or death decisions will be made by these officials, unguided and
uncurbed by statutory standards.
Id. at 667-68, 411 N.E.2d, at 1285.
The death penalty issue in Massachusetts did not end with this opinion. In a 1982 referendum,
Massachusetts voters approved a constitutional amendment which stated: "No provision of the
[state] constitution ... shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of
death." With the door seemingly closed to creative jurisprudential theory, the court focused upon an
inherent weakness in a newly enacted legislative death penalty statute to find the statue unconstitutional. It did so through article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the state constitution in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 470 N.E. 2d 116 (1983).
In Colon-Cruz, the court found the statutory provision providing for the death penalty unconstitutional as applied. The statute impermissibly burdened both the right against self-incrimination and
the right to jury trial guaranteed under article 12 of the Declaration of Rights. Id. at 124, 470 N.E.
2d at 119. The court's conclusion.was based upon the fact that the death penalty could be imposed
only after a jury trial. Id. The defendants who pled guilty in cases in which the death penalty could
be imposed would avoid that penalty. Id. As the court declared, "[tlhe inevitable consequence is that
defendants are discouraged from asserting their right not to plead guilty and their right to demand a
trial by jury." Id. See H. BEDAU, supra note 8, at 187-194 (more in-depth review of the death
penalty's recent history in Massachusetts). The ultimate importance of this case was described by
Bedau:
It is further evidence of the readiness of at least one state supreme court to give the closest
scrutiny to legislative attempts to create a constitutionally tolerable death penalty. Second,
it shows the difficulty in drafting capital statutes that do not run afoul of some constitutionally secured right of the defendant, quite apart from any question whether the death
penalty per se is a 'cruel and unusual punishment.'
H. BEDAU, supranote 8, at 194.
85. This Article does not attempt to assess the political costs of judicial invalidation of the
override based on the state constitution, but three observations deserve brief mention. First, public
support for capital punishment-high in Florida recently-by no means translates into public support for the override. My experience testifying in the Florida legislature convinces me that support
for the override is marginal. Florida Governor Chiles' apparant support for override repeal, see
McGarrahan, supra note 80, lends further reinforcement to this idea. Second, because the Florida
constitution is comparatively easy to amend, the effects of a "wrong" (i.e., publicly unpopular)
decision by the judiciary invalidating the override on state constitutional grounds would be less drastic than in virtually all other states. The Florida Revised Constitution of 1968 adopted a series of
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THE "NEw FEDERALISM"

No, my friend, the way to have good and safe government, is not to
trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many.... What has
destroyed liberty and the rights of man [sic] in every government
which has ever existed under the sun? The generalizing and
contracting [of] all cares and powers into one body...
6
Thomas Jefferson
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.
7
Louis Brandeis

According to a 1988 estimate, since 1970 state high courts have issued more than 450 opinions concluding that a state constitution afforded individuals broader rights than those afforded by the federal
Constitution.88 As state courts have re-discovered their respective state
constitutions,8 9 a "new federalism" has emerged in United States' jurisprudence. Schuman defined the term "new federalism" minimally
three amendments proposed by the legislature, included six methods of constitutional change-more
than any other state constitution. See generally Sturm, The Procedure of State Constitutional
Change, 5 FiA. ST. U.L. REa. 569 (1977). The Florida constitution has been amended 41 times
between the time of its adoption in 1968 and the end of 1985, a rate of 2.4 amendments per year. See
CouNcu. OF STATE GovEtRmsars, TmE BOOK OF THE STATES 14 (1986 ed.). The ease with which the
Florida constitution may be amended has been criticized because of the potential for legislative
abuse. E.g., Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the FloridaConstitution, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 747
(1977). Third, constitutional invalidation of the override would have a negligible effect on Florida's
death row population. As of April 24, 1991, Florida's death row held 295 people, the second most
populous of any state. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educationsl Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A.
at 15-17 (April 24, 1991) (unpublished compilation). According to the database developed by Dr.
Michael Radelet, as of May 2, 1991, fifteen Florida death row inmates who have received jury recommendations of life and who have had the jury overrides affirmed on appeal remain under sentence of death. Six additional inmates' cases are pending resentencing or resentencing appeal.
Telephone conversation with Michael Radelet (May 2, 1991). Two Florida inmates-Ernest Dobbert
and Buford White-were executed notwithstanding jury recommendations of life. Robert Francis is
scheduled to be executed on June 19, 1991.
86. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), in 4 Tm WRmNGs OF
THomtAs JEFFERSON 421 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (Monticello ed.).
87. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
88. Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 189, 217
(1988).
89. E.g., Grodin, The State Constitution:A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61
CAim. L. Rv.273 (1973); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of FundamentalRights,
35 RuToEs L. REv. 707 (1983); Symposium, Foreward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms andRules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tax. L. REv. 959 (1985); Note, United States
v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State ConstitutionalLaw, 1987 U.
ILL. L. REv. 311 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law- The Interpretationof State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HAav. L. Rav. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter Developments]; Note, Project Report: Toward an
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 H~av. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 271 (1973).
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to mean the state court practice of "developing interpretations of
their own states' constitutions independent of United States Supreme
Court interpretations of the federal Constitution.' '9 Justice Brennan,
an important advocate of the new federalism, argued that "[o]ne of
the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source
of protection for the rights of our citizens. "'
At the outset of the Republic, individual rights were protected
through various states' bills of rights. Passage of the federal bill of
rights created dual state and federal levels of protection. Over time,
the theory goes, incorporation of most of the federal bill of rights
through the fourteenth amendment, coupled with the Warren Court's
expansive interpretations of those rights, resulted in state reliance on
federal constitutional analysis, atrophy of independent state constitutional analysis, and erosion of dual protection for individual rights. 92
The new federalism posits that United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal Constitution are insufficient expressions
of individual rights throughout the fifty states. This assumption finds
support in the theory of federalism itself, the "old federalism" 93 sadly
and ahistorically tainted by its association with racist opposition to
Brown v. Board of Education.94 Federalist concerns limit the Court's
decisions. While principles of federal supremacy grant the Court the
power to review laws and judicial rulings in conflict with the federal
Constitution, statutes and regulations, the principles of state sovereignty and autonomy restrict federal jurisdiction where state constitutions, statutes and regulations are construed on independent and
adequate state grounds. 95 The sheer size of federal jurisdiction restricts

90. Schuman,. The Right to "'EqualPrivileges and Immunities:" A State's Version of "'Equal
Protection," 13 VT. L. REv. 221, 221 n. 2 (1988); see also Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State
Constitutions: The Emnergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tax. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1985);
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62
Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State
Constitution, 29 STA. L. Rv.297 (1977).
91. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAxv. L. RE,.
489, 503 (1977). In a study published in 1985, Brennan's article was listed as the nineteenth most
frequently cited law review article. Shapiro, The Most CitedLaw Review Articles, 73 CALI. L. Rav.
1540, 1550 (1985).
92. Abrahamson, supra note 90, at 1144-55; Utter & Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional
Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. Rav. 635, 640-645 (1985); Developments, supra note 89, at 1326-29.
93. "In reality the principles of the so-called 'New Federalism' are based upon legal principles
which have remained virtually unchanged throughout a large portion of our legal history. The only
thing which is 'new' is the pervasiveness of its application and the number of its adherents." Cooper,
Beyond the FederalConstitution, 18 STETsoN L. REv. 241, 279 n.233 (1989).
94. See generally F. Wnu.orr, TnE Pouncs oF MAssrvE REsISTANCE (1973); J.Wn.NsoN,
FRom BlowN To BAKE (1979).
95. Developments, supra note 89, at 1332-34.
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the Court to shaping general rules that can be implemented nationwide.9 Scope of jurisdiction further imposes practical constraints on
the range of issues the Court considers. 9
Scope of jurisdiction, and tension between federal supremacy and
state autonomy, result in Supreme Court decisions that establish federal minima, "floors" of rights which states may exceed. If state extensions of one federal right infringe upon another, the Court may
also establish federal maxima-or "ceilings" of rights. 9 Because the
Supreme Court is constrained by the range of issues it may practically
and legally consider, and is further restricted to establishing floors
and ceilings of federal rights, decisions by the Court can be deemed
insufficient expressions of individual rights throughout the fifty
states.
Federalism empowers each state to develop its own state constitutional jurisprudence uniquely expressive of its individual constitutional traditions." State constitutions not only establish restraints on
governmental intrusion of individual rights; they also grant positive
rights to individuals.?° State judiciaries have a broader range of individual rights to consider than do their federal counterparts.10 Because
states are smaller entities and because their constitutions are more easily and frequently amended, 102 state judiciaries have greater access to
the will, intent, traditions, customs, and special concerns of the people than do federal judges. 03 Finally, as the judiciary in most states is
subject to some form of democratic accountability, state rather than
federal constitutional jurisprudence should most richly reflect the sovereign will of the people.104 All of these factors favor independent and
active state constitutional jurisprudence expressive of each state's constitutional tradition.
The new federalism as presently practiced may have a "dark side," as
its critics05 assert. The new federalism raises problems of legitimacy and

%. Id. at 1348-51.
97.

Id.

98. Id. at 1336-40.
99. Utter & Pitier, supra note 92, at 635-37.
100. Id.; see also Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RuTGrm L.J. 881, 893 (1989); Titrone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in
a Rough Sea, 61 ST. Jon's L. REv. 431, 460 (1987).
101. Titrone, supra note 100, at 460-61.
102. The Florida constitution is especially easy to amend. See supra note 85.
103. Titrone, supra note 100, at 460-61.
104. Utter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 19, 34-35 (1989).
105. E.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor, 6 HAsTNGs CoNsr. L.Q. 975
(1979); Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DEN.
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creates the potential for unprincipled, non-neutral, ideological, resultoriented application. The new federalism, it can be argued, is at core a
gut-level dissatisfaction with decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, and federalism alone does not provide an adequate or legitimate

reason for state courts to reject Supreme Court doctrine.106

Regardless of the theoretical pros and cons of the new federalism, a
significant number of state courts3 7 have assumed a duty to exercise independent state constitutional jurisprudence to ensure that the dual protection of individual rights inherent in federalism is realized.1, The
perceived need to exercise this duty has become more acute in the last
twenty years.3 9 As the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have retreated
from the expanded protection of rights recognized during the Warren
Court era," 0 the federal judiciary has reduced one level of protection for
individual rights-while previous abandonment of state constitutional
analysis had virtually eliminated the other."' Recent Supreme Court
decisions" 2 have further induced states to take greater responsibility for
defining the individual rights of their populaces.
U.L. Rxv. 85 (1985); Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 AmNNAs 98
(1988); Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to Vermont Law Review Symposium on the
Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. Ry. 13 (1988); Waltz, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 Tax. L. REv. 995, 1018 (1985); Wilkes, supra note 90.
106. E.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9
HAsTiNos CoNsr. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Maltz, False Prophet: Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HAsr~nos Corsr. L.Q. 429, 432 (1988); Martineau, Review Esay: The
Status of State Government in Legal Education, 53 U. CN. L. Ray. 511, 516 (1984).
107. Collins & Skover, supra note 88.
108. For example, the New Hampshire ("live free or die") Supreme Court observed in 1983:
"When State constitutional issues have been raised, this court has a responsibility to make an independent determination of the protections afforded under the New Hampshire constitution. If we
ignore this duty, we fail to live up to our oath to defend our constitution and we help to destroy the
federalism that must be so carefully safeguarded by our people." State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350
(N.H. 1983); see also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 271, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (1983) ("The point is
... that a state's constitutional guarantees ...
were meant to be and remain genuine guarantees
against misuse of the state's governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling
tides of
federal case law both in method and specifics. State courts cannot abdicate their responsibility for
these independent guarantees, at least not unless the people of the State themselves choose to abandon them and entrust their rights entirely to federal law.").
109. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 178-79
(1984); Neuborne, supra note 100, at 885-87.
110. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547 (1986); Galie, Reliance on State Constitutions:
Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 403 (1984); but see Abrahamson, supra note 90, at 1153
n.42; Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
Rav. 873 (1976); Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court,
75 MICH. L. Rv. 1319 (1977); Wilkes, supra note 90.
111. See supra note 92 & accompanying text.
112. E.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health,
10 S. Ct 2841 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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States employ a diversity of approaches in implementing the new federalism.
A.

The Differing Approaches

State judiciaries have responded to the forces discussed in the previous subsection with various analytical methods and at different
speeds." 3 Although nomenclature varies widely,' 4 four identifiable
methods of state constitutional analysis have emerged: primacy, independent, interstitial, and lockstep.
1.

The PrimacyMethod: State ConstitutionalAnalysis First,
Supplemented by Federal

The primacy approach looks to the state constitution first, treating
the federal Constitution as supplemental filler. If analysis under the
state constitution is dispositive of the question presented, then the federal constitutional analysis is either ignored or used only as a persuasive
source of support." 5 While federal doctrine or tests may be applied in
state constitutional analysis (e.g., "substantive due process," "balancing of competing interests," or "levels of judicial scrutiny"), the primacy approach invites the state judiciary to articulate independent
standards of constitutional analysis." 6 Here the analytical focus is on the
state constitution, statutes and history (including legislative history), as
well as on the social and political setting and qn the fate of the relevant
7
clause in subsequent constitutions."
Promotion of federalism, development of a principled state constitutional jurisprudence, contribution to development of federal jurisprudence, and preservation of state autonomy by protecting state decisions
from federal review are among the articulated advantages of the pri-

113. Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights
Litigation Since 1980: A JudicialSurvey, 16 PuaIrus 141, 142 (1986).
114. See infra note 135.
115. Carson, "Last Things Last:" A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State
Courts, 19 WnLAmrr L. REv. 641, 647-49 (1983); Cooper, supra note 93, at 299; Linde, supra
note 109, at 173-79; Mahady, Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalJurisprudence:A Judge's
Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REv. 145, 146 (1988); Utter & Pitler, supra note 92, at 647; Developments,
supra note 89, at 1356-1357; Note, State Constitutions Realigning Federalism: A Special Look at
Florida,39 U. FL4. L. Rav. 733, 768-77 (1989).
116. Linde, supra note 109, at 186-88.
117. Cooper, supra note 93, at 294; Linde, supra note 109, at 178-79; Utter & Pitler, supra note
92, at 647; Developments, supra note 89, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 115, at 768-77. Cases exemplifying the primacy approach include State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983); State v.
Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); and State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1985).
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macy approach." 8 Unbridled judicial activism and the undermining of

nationwide uniformity in areas of law where it is of most import (such
as criminal law and law enforcement)" 9 are two criticisms leveled at the
primacy approach. A further criticism is dialogic. To the extent that
state courts employing the primacy approach omit discussion of federal

constitutional provisions, those states diminish their role in influencing
the development of federal jurisprudence. 120
2.

The Independent Method: Simultaneous Evaluation of State and
FederalConstitutions

The independent method of constitutional analysis calls for evaluation
of both state and federal provisions to determine protection afforded

under each even if analysis at one level is dispositive of the issue.121 This
method, sometimes known as the Vermont approach, lends full consideration to the relationship between state and federal constitutional
rights, thus enabling evolution of a highly principled and independent
body of state constitutional law.'2 However, the costs of this thorough-

ness include decreased judicial efficiency and increased risk of inviting
federal review, especially if there is no plain statement that the final de-

cision rests purely on state constitutional grounds. 2 The highest courts
of Vermont, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington provide examples of
this approach.'12
3.

The InterstitialMethod: FederalConstitutionalAnalysis First,
Supplemented by State

The interstitial approach mirrors the primacy approach, looking to
the federal Constitution first and treating the state constitution as sup-

118. Cooper, supra note 93, at 294; Linde, supra note 109, at 178-79; Utter & Pitler, supra note
92, at 647; Developments, supra note 89, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 109, at 768-77.
119. By contrast, Alexander Hamilton wrote that "there is one transcendent advantage belonging to the providence of the state governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear
and satisfactory light-I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." Tim FanmELLJT No. 17, at 113 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1864).
120. Cooper, supra note 93, at 294; Linde, supra note 109, at 178-79; Utter & Pitler, supra note
92, at 647; Developments, supra note 89, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 115, at 768-77.
121. Utter & Pitler, supra note 92, at 651-52.
122. Id.
123. Id. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (absent plain statement by state court to the
contrary, federal courts will presume that state court decisions were based on federal Constitution);
accord Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
124. Utter & Pitler, supra note 92, at 652 n.140. E.g., State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.
1984); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450
A.2d 336 (1982); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
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plementa1 23 If the federal Constitution is dispositive, then state constitutional analysis is not triggered? 26 Otherwise, several factors are
considered to determine specific grounds for diverging from the federal
analysis: textual differences, legislative history, pre-existing state law,
structural differences between the federal and state constitutions, particular state concerns, state traditions, and attitudes of the state citizenry. 2 7 In addition to establishing the need and grounds for divergence,
one must choose the manner or perspective through which divergence
will be effected: reactive or self reliant.'12
The reactive perspective responds to, criticizes, and amends the federal doctrine. It asks the pragmatic question: "How useful is the federal
analysis as a basis for state doctrine?" This perspective may be most
appropriate where there are analogous federal and state constitutional
provisions or where there is little maneuvering distance between the fed-

125. Cooper, supra note 93, at 296; Linde, supra note 109, at 178-79; Utter & Piter, supra note
92, at 651-52; Developments, supra note 89, at 1359; Note, supra note 115, at 767-71.
126. Cooper, supra note 93, at 296; Linde, supra note 108, at 178-79; Utter & Piter, supra note
92, at 651-52; Developments, supra note 89, at 1359; Note, supra note 115, at 767-71.
127. Developments, supra note 89, at 1359-62. In State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952
(1982), Justice Handler enumerated seven illustrative criteria for determining when to invoke the
state constitution as an independent source of individual rights protection:
(1) Textual language-A state constitution's language may itself provide a basis for
reaching a result different from that which could be obtained under federal law.
(2) Legislative History-[Llegislative history may reveal an intention that will support
reading the provision independently of federal law.
(3) Preexisting State law-Previously established bodies of state law may also suggest
distinctive state constitutional rights.
(4) Structural Differences-Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions might also provide a basis for rejecting the constraints of federal doctrine at the
state level. [For example, the] United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers .... Our [New Jersey] State Constitution, on the other hand, serves only to limit the
sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected representatives. Hence, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our Constitution can
be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon them.
(5) Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern-.... When particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a uniform national policy, they
are ripe for decision under state law.
(6) State Traditions-A state's history and traditions may also provide a basis for the
independent application of its constitution.
(7) Public Attitudes-Distinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry may also furnish
grounds to expand constitutional rights under state charters.
450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring).
An alternative set of factors, suggested in P. Boaarrr, CONSTITUIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE

CoNsMrrToN 3 (1982), and referenced in Linde, supra note 109, at 181-93, overlap with Handler's
and might also apply. Bobbitt's factors are constitutional text, history (legislative history, social and
political setting at the time of origin, fate of the clause in subsequent constitutions), doctrine, structure, prudence (where the court should be concerned about its own role, costs, and benefits of the
public policy), and ethics (fairness, equity, justice).
128. Developments, supra note 89, at 1362-66.
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eral floor and ceiling. The self reliant perspective creates original state
doctrine without reference to federal analysis. This perspective may be
most appropriate where there is a great deal of space between the federal
floor and ceiling, or where there is no federal analogue to a state constitutional provision.129
Advantages of the interstitial approach include conformity with the
supremacy principle, national uniformity of the law, judicial efficiency
(avoidance of redundant federal and state constitutional analyses), and
preservation of the federal floor of rights." 30 Critics of this approach
note several disadvantages: preventing coherent development of state
law; 131 creating an unwarranted presumption of validity for federal analysis under the state constitution, which undermines the state court's duty
to interpret the state constitution on its own merits; creating needless
work for the United States Supreme Court, and unnecessarily inviting
Supreme Court review; and subjecting state court decisions that provide
broader protection to criticisms of unbridled judicial activism rather
32
than principled development of state law. 1
4.

The Lockstep Method: State Constitutionsat the Vanishing Point

The lockstep approach calls for adoption of the federal standard
33
when there are analogous federal and state constitutional provisions.
There is no consideration of state analysis. In effect, this approach cuts
the state courts out of the federalism matrix whenever state constitutional provisions have federal counterparts.
The need for national uniformity is the primary justification for the
lockstep method. This approach has been criticized for undermining the
fundamental relationship between state and federal constitutions, breeding inconsistency with the classical model of federalism, and encroaching on the powers of the state judiciary to interpret their own

constitutions. '3
The typology of constitutional approaches' 35 discussed in this subsection is not the only way to organize the diverse universe of state consti-

129. Id. Note that the self reliant perspective begins to resemble, and has been equated with,
what this Article calls the primacy approach. See id. at 1362-66.
130. Id. at 1356-58.
131. Linde, supra note 109, at 178.
132. Utter & Pitier, supra note 92, at 650-51.
133. Cooper, supra note 93, at 294-96; Utter & Piter, supra note 92, at 645-46; Note, supra note
115, at 764-67.
134. Utter & Pitler, supra note 91, at 646. This approach is exemplified by State v. Finley, 173
Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977).
135. The terminology is maddeningly nonuniform. Cooper, for example, identified three of the
four approaches identified here: lockstep, independent, and an intermediate approach. Cooper, su-
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tutional jurisprudence. Even though Florida has "never explicitly
adopted any one approach,' 1 36 the categories described above provide a
helpful way of understanding Florida's treatment of the right to jury
trial under the state constitution.
B.

The Right to Jury Trial:Florida'sApproaches Under the State
Constitution

This subsection first identifies the constitutional methodology employed by the Florida Supreme Court in resolving state constitutional
issues of right to jury trial. 3 7 That is the easy part, as the court's approach is methodologically straightforward. Florida's constitutional
right to jury trial preserves the right as to those cases in which the

pra note 93, at 294-97. What Cooper called "independent" is here termed "primacy." What Cooper
referred to as "middle ground" is here termed "interstitial."
Utter and Pitler, supra note 92, at 645-52, called the various approaches lockstep (or absolute
harmony), primacy, interstitial (or supplemental), and dual sovereignty (here termed independent).
Linde, supra note 109, at 178-79, identified the independent, interstitial (or supplemental), and
primacy approaches without specifically labeling the independent and primacy approaches. Linde's
First Things First: Rediscovering the States Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. Ray. 329 (1980), is considered the seminal articulation of the primacy method.
The student-written Developments, supra note 89, at 1356-66, provided the most detailed discussion of the interstitial (or supplemental) approach and its three layers of inquiry: first, determining if
federal law is dispositive of the issues; second, exploring various factors to see if divergence from
federal law is justified; and third, determining if a reactive or self reliant perspective is warranted by
the circumstances. The piece equated self-reliant divergence from federal law with the primacy
method and suggested that this method is appropriate only "when a diversity of state specific factors
combine in a particular area to suggest that analogies between state and federal law are highly attenuated or when the state court has moved into an area in which federal parallels are unavailable." Id
at 1364. The authors rejected the primacy model itself, arguing that the approach's basic assumption-that states are the primary sovereigns-does not reflect post-incorporation realities. The piece
also recognized that when analyzing cases to determine what methodology has been used, it is often
extremely difficult to differentiate between a self-reliant/interstitial approach and a primacy approach when there is no clear statement whether the analysis is starting from a federal or state
constitutional provision.
Another student work, Note, supra note 115, at 764-70, discussed the dependent (or lockstep)
approach, interstitial (or "gap filler") approach, and the independent approach (here termed the
primacy approach).
136. Cooper, supra note 93, at 294; see also id. at 297. Cooper recommended what he termed a
"reactive" approach, which
seems at present, to be the appropriate vehicle for adoption by the Florida judiciary to
protect state constitutional rights. Under this approach, the Florida courts may consider
and then accept or reject prevailing federal interpretations of similar constitutional provisions. This permits state courts the benefits of the federal analysis, along with the analysis
of other state courts, while leaving the final decision to the Florida courts.
Id. at 297.
137. This Article therefore has as its focus the entitlement to jury trial under the state constitution. The Florida Supreme Court has relied upon the Florida constitution in resolving issues concerning the incidents of the jury trial right to which one is entitled. E.g., State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481
(Fla. 1984) (rejecting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1966)).
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right to jury trial was recognized in 1845-the time Florida adopted its
first state constitution.
This subsection then attempts to place the court's constitutional approach within the typology summarized in the previous subsection.
This task is less straightforward. Still, the attempt is interesting and
important in light of Spaziano v. Florida'sresolution of the jury override issue as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Two sections of Florida's Declaration of Rights protect the guarantee of trial by jury. Section 22 provides that "the right of trial by jury
shall be secure to all and remain inviolate."' 3 Section 16 provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . have the right to
39
• . . trial by impartial jury.'
The right to trial by jury in Florida traces its roots to the state's first
constitution. "Our first Constitution, known as the Constitution of
1838, though it did not become effective until Florida was admitted to
the Union in 1845, provided that the right of trial by jury shall forever
remain inviolate."'' 4 Florida's constitution "has contained similar language throughout our history.' ' 4' The Florida Supreme Court and the
Fourth District Court of Appeals have characterized the right to jury
trial as "the paramount law of the land,"' 42 and "an organic right that
under no circumstances should be denied.' ' 43 The supreme court has
stated that "[questions as to the right to a jury trial should be resolved,
if at all possible, in favor of the party seeking the jury trial, for that
right is fundamentally guaranteed by the U.S. and Florida Constitutions." '"

Although it is sometimes difficult to identify the Florida Supreme
Court's constitutional methodology in a given area of substantive law,
the court's treatment of the right to jury trial is fairly straightforward.
Almost a century of precedent states and restates the incantation that
138. FLA. Cos-T. art. I, § 22.
139. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 16. Further, the Florida constitution prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment." FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 17. This latter provision, though not the subject of much case law
development, should require enhanced scrutiny of the procedure at issue here because death may be
the penalty imposed. The disjunctive phrasing was important to the California Supreme Court in
construing that state's counterpart constitutional provision. See supra note 84. Further, some Florida
Supreme Court justices appear increasingly receptive to the idea that because death is different from
other punishments the state constitution demands enhanced scrutiny of capital cases. See, e.g.,
Woods v. State, 531 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (three dissenting justices arguing
that the Florida and federal constitutions forbid execution of the mentally retarded).
140. Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687, 698, 173 So. 820, 825 (1937).
141. Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (quoting State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826,

828 (Fla. 1976)).
142.
143.
144.

State v. Peacock, 126 Fla. 743, 171 So. 821 (1937).
Tesher & Tesher, P.A. v. Rothfield, 392 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65, 71 (Fla. 1975).
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the Florida constitution "guarantees the right to trial by jury in only
those cases in which the right was recognized at the time of the adoption of the State's first constitution.' ' 45 Thus, in deciding whether there
is a right to jury trial in a given justiciable controversy, one must determine whether that controversy was resolved by the jury "when the
Constitution of 1838 became effective in 1845."' 6
This historically-based approach to the jury trial right has not been

without dissent. Some justices have urged the court to avoid the
straight-jacket of history-of only looking to the state of the common

law as of 1845. Justice Boyd wrote in 1984 that
145. State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976).
146. Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687, 698, 173 So. 2d 820, 825 (1937). See
also In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986) (jury trial provision
"guarantees the right to trial by jury in those cases in which the right was enjoyed at the time this
state's first constitution became effective"); Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (quoting State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976)) ("It has long been established that this jury
trial] provision guarantees the right to trial by jury in only those cases in which the right was recognized at the time of the adoption of the State's first constitution"); Smith v. Barnett Bank, 350 So.
2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); In re Jones, 339 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Exparte
Scudmore, 55 Fla. 211, 217, 46 So. 279, 283 (1908)) jury trial right "merely secured it in those cases
in which it was a matter of right before the adoption of the [first] constitution"); Hilliard v. City of
Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 1968) (jury trial "guarantee does not extend to cases for which
there was no right to a jury trial prior to adoption of the [first] constitution"); Carter v. State Road
Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1966) (jury trial right "means that if, at the time of [the first
constitution's] adoption, there was a right to a jury trial in a given justiciable controversy such right
thereafter remained inviolate"); Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1960) (jury trial
provision was "never intended to extend the right of jury trial but had the effect only of securing it
in the cases in which it was a matter of right before the adoption of the [first] Constitution"); J.B.
Green Realty Co. v. Warlow, 130 Fla. 220, 227, 177 So. 535, 538 (1937) (quoting Hunt v. City of
Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 506, 16 So. 398, 399 (1894)) (jurytrial right "merely secures it in the cases
in which it was matter of right before the adoption of the [first] constitution"); Hawkins v. Reilim
Inc., 92 Fla. 784, 788, 110 So. 350, 351 (1926) (jury trial provisions "designed to preserve and
guarantee the right of trial by jury in proceedings according to the course of the common law as
known and practiced at the time of the adoption of the [first] constitution"); State v. Parker, 87 Fla.
181, 187, 100 So. 260, 262 (1924) (jury trial guarantee "never intended to extend the right of jury
trial, but merely secures it in the cases in which it was [a] matter of right before the adoption of the
[first] Constitution") (emphasis in original); Ex parte Scudmore, 55 Fla. 211, 225, 46 So. 279, 283
(1907) (jury trial right secured only in "those cases in which it was matter of right before the adoption of the [first] constitution"); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 310, 45 So. 499, 501 (1907) (jury
provision "does not extend the right but merely secures it in cases in which it was matter of right
before the adoption of the [first] Constitution"); Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 48 Fla. 226,
227, 37 So. 722, 723 (1904) (right serves to "secure the right in those cases only in which it was
enjoyed when the Constitution became effective"); Hawthorne v. Panama Park Co., 44 Fla. 194,
196, 32 So. 812, 813 (1902) (jury right "guarantees to the citizen a right of trial by jury only in those
cases where at the time of the adoption of the [first] constitution the law gave that right"); Hughes
v. Hanah, 39 Fla. 365, 371, 22 So. 613, 615 (1897) (jury trial provision was "designed to preserve
and guaranty the right to trial by jury in proceedings according to the course of the common law as
known and practiced at the time of the adoption of the [first] constitution"); Wiggins v. Williams,
36 Fla. 637, 659, 18 So. 859, 866 (1894) (procedure deprives one of jury trial right if it "deprives a
party of the right of trial by jury in a case according to the course of the common law when the
[first] constitution was adopted").
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in construing our constitution we should not blindly abide by the
federal standards [or] strictly adhere to our past precedents. Our
function is not to determine what our constitution has meant in the
past, but rather to determine what it should mean now and in the
future. Because of the extreme importance our society places upon a
person's right to be judged by [her] peers, our constitution should be
liberally interpreted to provide a right to jury trial in all criminal
proceedings. 47
Justice Shaw, concurring in the case in which Boyd wrote these words,
me that
agreed that the "history of this nation's development convinces
' 14
future."'
the
to
view
a
with
the constitution was written
Justice Shaw in 1985 called upon the court to "reexamine our approach to the right to trial by jury," and he attempted to provide
"more rational criteria which will reinvigorate" the jury trial provisions. 49 The retrospective approach "unnecessarily freezes the development of the ... right" at an arbitrary time in the past, with the result
that the constitutional guarantee "atrophies and the right becomes increasingly less effectual as new criminal offenses are enacted into statutes for which there is no statutory right to trial by jury.' ' 15
I find Justice Shaw's position convincing, but it has not yet commanded a majority of the court. Speaking as a court issuing holdings,
the Florida Supreme Court has never deviated seriously from the proposition that in deciding jury trial issues, the controlling frame of reference is the state of Florida's law as of 1845. 15
The question now becomes how to classify the Florida Supreme
Court's jury trial approach. Resolution of this issue is of no small doctrinal importance. If the court's approach is deemed to be primacy,
then Spaziano v. Florida's decision on the federal constitutionality of
the jury override is irrelevant-not even persuasive authority, much less
definitive. If Florida's approach is characterized as lockstep, then Spaziano v. Florida controls the state constitutional issue as well as the
federal. If Florida's approach is considered to be independent or interstitial, then the Florida courts have varying degrees of latitude in deciding the state constitutional consequences of the jury override.
On its face, the retrospective inquiry of the Florida Supreme Court
appears to fit most comfortably within the primacy theory. Whether a
matter was triable by jury in Florida in 1845 is an issue resolved, at

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 840-41 (Fla. 1984) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
Id. at 840 (Shaw, J., specially concurring).
Reed v. State, 470 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting).

Id.
See supra note 146.
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least in the abstract, without reference to federal law. In practice, however, the Florida Supreme Court's approach is more difficult to classify.
Florida's treatment of jury trial issues calls for separate analysis of
the right under article I, section 22, granting a right to jury trial in civil
cases, and article I, section 16, granting a right to jury trial in criminal
cases. Both provisions, most recently restated in the 1968 Florida constitution, have federal analogues: the seventh amendment for article I,
section 22, and the sixth amendment for article I, section 16. However,
only the sixth amendment has been incorporated and applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. 1 2 Thus there exists no dual
protection regarding the right to jury trial in civil cases, and states must
develop their own law. By contrast, there is dual protection of the right
to jury trial in criminal matters. Given this distinction, one would expect that in civil jury trial matters the courts would use a primacy approach, looking only to state law. In criminal jury trial matters,
however, the court could utilize any of the four methods outlined in the
previous subsection-depending upon how it views issues of federal supremacy and state autonomy, as well as upon how the Florida court
views its duty to interpret the Florida constitution.
In civil jury trial cases, the prevailing approach is indeed the methodology of primacy. Cases examining whether a right to civil jury trial
existed at common law in 1845 explicitly rely upon article I, section 22,
and upon state common law as of 1845.111 Employing this primacy approach, the Florida Supreme Court has found that a right to civil jury
trial exists as to in rem forfeiture proceedings 154 and civil commitment
proceedings,'55 as well as when a common law issue is raised in a compulsory counterclaim to an equity issue, 56 damages for trespass'57 or

152. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating sixth amendment right to jury
trial in criminal cases into fourteenth amendment); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 216 (1916) (declining to incorporate seventh amendment right to civil jury trial).
153. E.g., In Re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986); In re Jones,
339 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 1976); Carter v. State Road Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1976);
Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501 (1963); J.B. Green Realty Co. v. Warlow, 130 Fla. 220, 227,
177 So. 535, 538 (1937) (quoting Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 506, 16 So. 398 (1894));
Hawkins v. Relim Inc., 92 Fla. 784, 788, 110 So. 350, 351 (1926); Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 48 Fla. 226, 227, 37 So. 722, 723 (1904); Hawthorne v. Panama Park Co., 44 Fla. 194, 32 So.
812 (1902); Hughs v. Hanah, 39 Fla. 365, 371, 22 So. 613, 615 (1897); Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla.
637, 659, 18 So. 859, 866 (1896).
154. In Re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
155. In Re Jones, 339 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1976). See generally Note, The Confinement of Mabel
Jones, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 103 (1977).

156.
157.

Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1963).
Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1896).
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ejection. 5 ' There is no right to jury trial in actions for eminent domain, 15 9 enjoining trespass,' 60 partitioning, 6 quiet title, 62 or revocation
of a real estate license. 6 These cases tend to speak in terms of the state
constitution as though the federal Constitution did not exist.
If primacy is the analysis of choice for civil jury trial issues, the approach taken in criminal jury trial cases is more difficult to place within
the typology summarized in the previous subsection. Determining the
method of constitutional analysis employed in criminal cases is problematic for two reasons. First, article I, section 22 and related legal reasoning are often referenced in criminal right to jury trial cases more
appropriately analyzed under article I, section 16, and under the sixth
amendment to the federal Constitution. Justice Shaw has argued in separate opinions that
the origin of our present reading of the Florida Constitution's right to
trial by jury, which emphasizes the "remain inviolate" language of
article I, section 22, to the neglect of article I, section 16 which
affirmatively grants the right to trial by jury in all criminal
prosecutions, can be found in Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts,
Allen and Co., 2 Fla. 102 (1848) [,] ... a civil case.... This
emphasis, proper though it was in Flint River, was to have
unfortunate consequences when it came to be applied to a criminal
prosecution. '64
Second, the right to jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed under
article I, section 16 of the Florida constitution and under the sixth
amendment-except when the "crime" is a violation of a local ordinance or falls under one of four classes of federal "petty" crime exceptions. These petty crime exceptions to the right to jury trial have their
roots in federal jurisprudence, as outlined by the Florida Supreme
Court in Whirley v. State: 6 a crime indictable in 1845; a crime resulting in less than six months in prison or more than a $500 fine; a crime
that is malum in se; or a crime that involves moral turpitude. 6
Many criminal jury trial cases turn on the distinction between petty
and serious crimes, incorporating an inquiry into whether the offense

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
Reed v.
165.
166.

Hughes v. Hanah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 So. 613 (1897).
Carter v. State Road Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793 (1966).
Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 636, 18 So. 859 (1896).
Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 48 Fla. 226, 37 So. 722 (1904).
Hawthorne v. Panama Park Co., 44 Fla. 194, 32 So. 812 (1902).
J.B. Green Realty Co. v. Warlow, 130 Fla. 220, 177 So. 535 (1937).
Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., specially concurring); see also
State, 470 So. 2d 1382, 1387 (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
450 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1984).
Id. at 839.
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was indictable in 1845.167 Because this criterion is similar to that used in
civil jury trial cases, it may be argued that criminal cases relying on this
factor to determine classification of crimes use the primacy approach
because they rely upon the state constitution and upon state common
law. At least prior to incorporation of the sixth amendment in 1968,
one would expect criminal right to jury trial cases to be determined on a
primacy basis because, like civil jury trial issues, the federal analogue
was not applicable to the states.
However, that was not necessarily so. Unlike civil cases, at least since
1968 there has been a federal constitutional analogue made applicable
to the states regarding the right to jury trial in criminal matters-the
sixth amendment. Further, the criteria for classification adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court is based upon the federal petty crimes exception.1 6s One could, therefore, make the case that the court follows a self
reliant/interstitial approach in deciding criminal right to jury trial cases.
The court first analyzes the issue under the federal constitution and federal law to determine whether or not it is a serious crime; only then
does the court look to state common law to determine if the crime was
indictable in 1845.
Three cases illustrate the different approaches employed by the Florida Supreme Court in this area. Most recently, in Reed v. State'69 in
1985, the court seemed to employ the interstitial approach in deciding a
criminal jury trial issue. Reed asserted a right to jury trial in county
court for a petty statutory offense of criminal mischief. The supreme
court's reasoning agreeing with Reed's claim was twofold: first, the
United States Constitution was implicated; second, the court had ruled
previously in Whirley v. State'70 that the federal petty crime exception
to jury trial in criminal proceedings also applied to the state constitution. In applying the federal petty crimes exception, the Reed court explained that a maximum penalty of more than six months
imprisonment might be sufficient to classify a crime as serious. However, a crime with less than six months may still be a serious crime if it
was indictable at common law in 1845.

167. E.g., Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (quoting State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d
826, 828 (Fla. 1976)); Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 1968); Boyd v.
County of Dade, 123 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1960); State v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 187, 100 So. 260, 262
(1924); Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 506 (1894).
168. Although some cases involve the right to jury trial when a criminal court commits a person
due to incorrigibility or insanity rather than classification of a crime as petty or serious, such cases
still rely on the same criteria as those in the petty/serious cases cited above. E.g., Ex Parte Scudmore, 55 Fla. 211, 217, 46 So. 279, 283 (1908); Pugh v Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 310, 45 So. 499, 501

(1907).
169.
170.

470 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1985).
450 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1984).
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The court in Reed employed a federal analysis, looked to Florida
state law, relied on both federal and state case law, and held that a
right to jury trial for charges of criminal mischief does exist. This was
so even though the penalty for criminal mischief was less than sixty
days. The controlling fact was that the crime of criminal mischief had
been indictable at common law in 1845. Emphasis on the federal analysis of the petty/serious distinction, coupled with no explicit statement
of a state law basis for its decision, suggests that this case could fairly
be categorized as an interstitial/self reliant analysis. This is so notwithstanding the overarching fact that the constitutional frame of reference
itself-grounding the inquiry in the state of Florida law as of 1845-is
an analysis that is purely a matter of state law.
Any categorization of Florida's jury trial approach as interstitial,
based on Reed, ought to be provisional, however. One year prior to
Reed, the analysis employed by the court in Whirley v. State17 1-the
case relied upon in Reed 72-could be labeled either interstitial or independent. Whirley presented the question whether citizens had a right to
jury trial for traffic violations. The court in Whirley first analyzed the
right to jury trial under the sixth amendment and the federal petty offense exception and found no federally protected right to jury trial. The
court went on to determine whether the right to jury trial for traffic
violations was protected under the Florida constitution and concluded
that it was not. The court's reasoning included subsidiary holdings that
the federal petty crimes exception applied to article 1, section 16 of the
Florida constitution, and that there was no statutory right to trial by
jury because "the legislature failed to grant one in the case of one
charged with driving or being in control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or above."' 73 This "federal first, state second"
analysis exemplifies either a self reliant/interstitial or an independent
approach.
Reed thus employed the interstitial approach in 1985; Whirley employed the self reliant/interstitial or independent approach in 1984. The
plot thickens when one considers that Reed and Whirley both cited with
approval State v. Webb.1 74 The court in Webb in 1976 clearly employed
a primacy approach. Webb involved a claim that a defendant charged
with a violation of a state statute requiring motor vehicles to have a
valid inspection certificate is entitled to a jury trial. The court based its
holding squarely on the state constitution:

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
470 So. 2d at 1383 (citing Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1984)).
Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1984).
335 So. 2d 826 (FIa. 1976). E.g., Reed, 470 So. 2d at 1324; Whirley, 450 So. 2d at 838.
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We therefore hold that, there being no right to a trial by jury for this
traffic violation at the time of the adoption of Florida's first
constitution, the denial of a jury trial by [the inspection statute] is not
prohibited by Fla. Const. art. I, 22. 1'1
Further, the Webb court stated that while "we are influenced by the
fact that, even if this statute had not been decriminalized and still involved a criminal violation for which incarceration was a possible punishment, the right to a jury trial as provided by the sixth amendment of
the United States Constitution would not apply" because the crime was
petty-the penalty never exceeded sixty days imprisonment or a $500
fine. 76 Webb is a classic example of a primacy analysis, where the holding explicitly is based on state grounds and federal issues are addressed
as influential but not dispositive.
The Florida Supreme Court's constitutional approach in this area
therefore is difficult to pigeonhole. On the one hand, it could be said
that the court has evolved from Webb through Whirley to Reed: In
criminal right to jury trial matters, the court has over time moved from
a primacy analysis (that paralleled civil jury trial analysis) to a self reliant/interstitial approach that first addresses the federal sixth amendment right and then, applying the federal petty crime exception to
article I, section 16, analyzes the right to jury trial most frequently on
the basis of whether the crime was indictable or whether a right to jury
trial existed at common law in 1845.
On the other hand, Webb lives. And of the three cases, Webb's analytical framework is the clearest; Reed and Whirley can perhaps be dismissed as examples of infelicitous opinion drafting. Not only has
Webb's worldview never been repudiated, but.,the court continues to
cite with approval Webb-a case that embodies the primacy approach.
Placing the jury trial cases into a larger doctrinal context is not terribly illuminating. Review of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions in
other constitutional areas provides no clear guidance. These cases do,
however, support the idea that if there is no federal analogue in jury
trial cases, then the court tends to use the primacy approach. If there is
a federal analogue, the court's approaches to constitutional analysis
vary.' 7 The court does not use any one method of constitutional analysis consistently except where search and seizure, privacy and abortion,
or distribution of powers are concerned.
In substantive areas where there are federal analogues to state constitutional provisions, the analytical method ranges across all four meth-

175.
176.
177.

Webb, 335 So. 2d at 828-29.
Id. at828.
See generally Cooper, supra note 93.
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odologies: lockstep, interstitial, independent, and primacy. The Florida
constitution mandates the lockstep approach in search and seizure
cases.' 78 Due process and equal protection cases evince a mixture of
methods. Most due process cases employ the interstitial approach,'7
though several cases use the primacy method1so Recent equal protection
cases reveal a split between the interstitial and independent approaches.'' Ex post facto cases tend to employ the independent ap-

178. The search and seizure provision of the Florida constitution, added in 1982, is unique in the
state constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception
of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated.... This right shall be construed in conformity
with the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CoNsr. art. I § 12 (emphasis added).
While this provision does not absolutely preclude increased protection where there is no controlling United States Supreme Court authority, or where the Florida legislature enacts specific increased
protections, it is a clear mandate from the sovereign people of Florida with which the courts must
and do comply. See generally Cooper, supra note 93, at 275-79; Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal
Law, 39 U. FLA. L. Rav. 653 (1987). Chief Justice Burger applauded this provision of the Florida
constitution. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
179. Due process cases using the primacy approach include State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 131 (Fla.
1989) (ex parte order compelling participation in a police lineup violated article I, section 9 of the
Florida constitution); Hill v. State, 549 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1989) (court explicitly rejected a broader
federal interpretation and found that failure to admit double hearsay testimony did not violate article
1, section 16 of the Florida constitution regarding right to a fair and speedy trial in criminal matters);
State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1989) (court rejected the narrow application of the due
process defense found in federal cases and held that payment of a contingent fee to an informant
conditioned on cooperation and testimony needed for a successful prosecution violated article I,
section 9 of Florida's constitution); Department of Ins. v. Dade Cty. Consumer Adv., 492 So. 2d
1032, 1035 (Fla. 1986) (court employed a substantive due process, rational relationship test in finding
two statutes "unconstitutional under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution to the extent they
prohibited insurance agents from rebating any portion of their commission to their customers").
180. Due process cases evincing the interstitial approach include Spivey v. State, 529 So. 2d
1088, 1095 (Fla. 1988) (under fourteenth amendment, the court reversed the judge's sentence of
death because the judge erred in imposing the death penalty when "there was a reasonable basis for
the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment"); Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1983) (court
explicitly relied on the sixth and fourteenth amendments in finding that consideration of testimony
given at another trial unconstitutionally denied an opportunity to cross examine and confront during
a sentencing hearing; the court vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing without
enpanelling another jury).
Cases decided pursuant to the interstitial approach implicitly operate under an assumption that
absent a clear and plain statement of a state basis for a decision, a federal basis will be inferred.
Such cases include Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1989) (court held a defendant must be
given notice before costs are assessed against him, noting that "this holding goes to the very heart of
the requirements of the due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions"); Garron v. State,
528 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1988) (court relied on United States Supreme Court cases to find use of postMiranda silence as evidence of sanity violated due process); Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1988) (trial court erred in overriding jury recommendation of life because reasonable people could
differ that death was the appropriate penalty).
181. E.g., United Tel. Long Distance v. Nichols, 546 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1989) (order requiring
a long-distance telephone subsidiary to compensate the local exchange parent and its ratepayers for
intangible benefits derived from the parent "is neither confiscatory nor violative of the due process
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proach,2' while civil rights cases addressing freedoms of speech,
religion, and assembly apply the interstitial approach. 83 Thus the Florida Supreme Court employs a variety of approaches when addressing
constitutional issues in substantive areas where there are federal and
state constitutional analogues. Although no one approach is used consistently, on balance the court tends to favor the interstitial approach.
Where there is no federal analogue to state constitutional provisions
or where the federal analogue is not applicable to the states, the Florida
Supreme Court uses a purely state-based primacy approach. Where distribution of powers is at issue, the court relies solely on the Florida
constitution.'8 While there is no federal textual analogue to Florida's
privacy provision under article I, section 23, there has been controversy
over several federal decisions regarding the right to privacy in decisional
issues concerning the right to die'85 and right to an abortion. 8 6 Disclosural issues overlap with search and seizure matters depending upon the
circumstances of the case. The .privacy cases suggest that the Florida
Supreme Court uses a different analytical approach in privacy cases un-

or equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions"); Texaco, Inc. v. Department of
Transp., 537 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989) (without explicit reference to state or federal basis for its decision,
court rejected an equal protection claim).
182. E.g., State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989) (retrospective application of an amendment
requiring that multiple punishment be imposed for separate offenses where only one act is involved
violated both federal and state constitutions); State v. McGriff, 537 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1989) (retrospective application of Florida Statutes chapter 87-110 violated the ex post facto clauses of the Florida and federal constitutions).
183. E.g., Firestone v. News-press Pub. Co., 538 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1989) ("we hold that
section 101.121, Florida statutes.... is overbroad in violation of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution"); Sakon v. Pepsi Co., 553 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1989) (commercial speech
afforded a limited measure of protection under the first amendment, which does not suffice to bar
state action).
184. E.g., Lanca Homeowners v. Lantana Cascade, 541 So. 2d 1121, 1123-24 (Fla. 1989) (section 723.079(1) of the Florida Statutes "constituted an unconstitutional intrusion on [the] Court's
rulemaking authority" because the section was procedural and within the court's exclusive domain
under article V, section 2(a) of the Florida constitution); Department of Bus. Reg. v. Classic Mile,
Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1989) (court held statute unconstitutional under article 3, section 10 and
11(b) of the Florida constitution); Laborers' Intern., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla.
1989) (county board exercised proper quasi-judicial powers under article V, section I of the Florida
constitution); Watson v. First Fla. Leasing, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1989) (statute requiring claimant to file written notice of an action in an estate proceeding held unconstitutional because it was
procedural and trespassed upon the court's rulemaking authority); White v. Board of County Commissioners, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989) (court found statute limiting attorneys' fees for representation of indigent defendants to $3,500 unconstitutional when applied in time-consuming and costly
capital cases, because the legislature thereby curtailed the court's inherent power to secure effective,
experienced counsel in violation of article V, section 1 and article II, section 3 of the Florida constitution).
185. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
186. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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der article 1, section 23, depending upon the nature of the claim. The
primacy approach is used in abortion cases,'1 the interstitial approach
in right to die cases.'8 Disclosural decisions'" appear to trigger a primacy analysis, but they are influenced by the lockstep mandate for
search and seizure claims.
Two important principles emerge from this discussion. First, the central constitutional frame of reference in deciding Florida jury trial issues is the state's law as of 1845. Second, in deciding jury trial claims
under the state constitution the Florida Supreme Court's approach is
not lockstep-Spaziano v. State notwithstanding. The court's approach
may be categorized as primacy, independent, or self reliant/interstitial,
but in any of these categories the court remains free-if not obligatedto disregard the federal courts' resolution of the jury override's federal
constitutionality in Spaziano v. Florida. Spaziano v. Florida marks the
beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. In other words, the Florida Supreme Court in this area retains the jurisdiction to do justice.
IV.

Tim JURY OVwnDE AND THE FLORiDA CoNsTrrUIoN

When juries differ with the result at which the judge would have
arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very
purposes for which they were created and for which they are now
employed."90

187. E.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (statute requiring parental consent for
abortions performed on a minor held unconstitutional under article 1, section 23 of Florida's
constitution); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972) (statute imposing a prison term for
manslaughter on persons who employed any means of causing an abortion unless two physicians
attested the procedure was necessary to save the life of the mother held unconstitutional, on the
basis that it violated the state constitution's due process clause); see generally Cope, To Be Let
Alone, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rlv. 671 (1978); Maher, Has the Florida ConstitutionalRight to Decisional Privacy Finally Come of Age?, F.A. B.J. 23 (July/August 1990); Note, Interpreting Florida'sNew Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33 U. FLA. L. REv.565 (1981); Note, Toward a Right
to Privacy, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 631 (1977).
188. In Public Health Tr. of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989), instead of
explicitly stating that article I, section 23 of the Florida constitution was the basis of the court's
decision to protect Ms. Wos' constitutional rights of privacy and religion, the justices analyzed
the right under Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). The Wons court grounded the
right of privacy in the federal Constitution, thus evincing an interstitial approach. A primacy
approach would have been expected since there was no explicit federal analogue.
189. In Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989), although the court used the primacy
approach, citing article I section 23 as the basis for its decision, it noted that this section does
not enlarge a citizen's right to privacy for purposes of search and seizure where, as there, a pen
register device was installed with all due procedural safeguards. Thus, the Florida lockstep provision regarding search and seizure overrode the privacy provision where disclosural issues were
involved.
190. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).

962

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:923

Justice Shaw's critique of the Florida Supreme Court's constitutional
approach to jury trial issues makes sense. I see little reason, beyond
formalism and an attachment to false consistency, to focus only on the
state of the law at 1845-to the exclusion of all else. An expanded inquiry into the folly of the override would permit consideration of the
functional, historical, and policy considerations Ruthann Robson and I
discussed in 1985.' 9' Still, the court appears wedded to the retrospective
analysis. Even under that cramped analysis, however, the jury override
should not pass state constitutional muster.
At the time Florida adopted its first constitution in 1845, capital punishment was for the most part mandatory upon conviction by the jury
(unless waived) of specified offenses. If the state constitution does in
fact freeze the world in 1845, than a paradoxical argument can be made
that capital punishment is a per se violation of the Florida constitution.
The only sentencing scheme permitted by the Florida constitution in
1845 (mandatory sentencing by juries) falls afoul of the federal Constitution as construed today, which clearly prohibits mandatory capital
sentencing.'9 That is paradoxical at least. Can a defendant possibly
have a state constitutional right to a federally unconstitutional procedure?
There are at least two ways to escape the dilemma crafted in the preceding paragraph. The first emphasizes that the analytical focus here
must remain on the jury trial right. The right to jury trial in capital
sentencing proceedings in 1845 does not imply a right to the same total
capital sentencing structure-mandatory sentencing-that existed at
that time. All that remains guaranteed inviolate is the right to jury trial
as it existed in 1845.
Second, the dilemma could be evaded by the adoption of a state constitutional analysis that recognizes that the world is not entirely frozen
in 1845. The task of courts would be to identify the core attributes of
the common law right to jury trial, as those principles existed in 1845
and as they have matured over time. The essential attribute was that in
1845 a jury's verdict for life was final. That attribute goes to the heart
of the jury system in 1845 and today. Only Furman v. Georgia warped
this core idea beyond recognition. 93
The historical record suggests that in 1845 capital punishment in
Florida was for the most part mandatory. Once the jury found the de191. Mello & Robson, supra note 7.
192. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
193. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 48 (Florida's jury override was enacted by the legislature at least in part due to reasonable misconceptions about the requirements of Furman). See
also Mello & Robson, supra note 7, at 68-70; Note, supra note 48.
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fendant guilty of a capital offense, the court had no alternative but
death or a lesser sentence.194 For certain crimes when committed by
Black 95 slaves, the court had the discretion to impose penalties of less
than death. 196
In 1822, when Florida became a Territory, it became necessary to
enact a criminal code. The First Legislative Council of Florida, meeting
in Pensacola, passed "An Act for the Apprehension of Criminals, and
the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 97 This act, which provided for the first sanctioned death penalty under Florida's territorial
or state authority, designated three offenses as capital: murder, rape,
194. See generallyA MAUA. OR DIGEST OF THE STATuTE LAW OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, tit.
I, ch. I, 1, p. 4 8 9 [hereinafter DIGEST]; An Act relating to Crimes and Misdemeanors, Feb. 10,
1832 § 1 [hereinafter "1832 Act"].
The cover page of the Digest states that the compilation included the "Statute Law of the
State of Florida, of a General and Public Character, in Force at the end of the Second Session of
the General Assembly of the State, on the Sixth Day of January, 1847." However, it was authorized by an act of the general assembly in 1845, and none of the capital offenses cited here

were amended between 1845 and 1847. Some changes were made in the general criminal provisions between 1845 and 1847, and they were included in the Digest. E.g., tit. I, ch. VII, 119,
p.501; 1846 Act, ch. 91, § I (liquor licenses required); tit. I, ch. VII, 20, p.502; 1846 Act, ch.
91, § 2 (take-out liquor sales permitted); tit.I, ch. XII, 16, p. 510; 1846 Act, ch. 75, § 2 (selling
liquor to slaves); tit. I, ch. XIV, 1, p.518; 1846 Act, ch. 118, § 1 (certain rivers declared navigable); tit. II, ch. I, § 3, 1 1, 2, 3 & 4, p.536; 1846 Act, ch. 104, §§ 1 & 2 (duties of jailors with
respect to federal prisoners); tit. II, ch. III, § 3, 11, 2 & 3, p.526; 1846 Act, ch. 76, §§ 2 & 3
(judgments for costs); tit. III, ch. IV, 4 1, 2, 3 & 4, p.536; 1846 Act, ch. 104, §§ 1, 2, 3, & 4
(addressing the migration of Florida persons of color to Key West).
Because none of the 1846 changes appeared to affect any capital offense statute, the Digest
seems to be an accurate compilation of the statutory law of death as of 1845.
195. "I capitalize 'Black' because I regard it not simply as a colour but as a cultural, personal, and political identity." Joseph, Book Review, 9 SIGNs 134 (1983).
196. Some crimes were made applicable to "any person" who committed the offense; however, some crimes and misdemeanors were made applicable only to "slaves, free negroes, and
mulattoes." DIGEST, supra note 194, tit. IV, ch. I, § 3; An Act Relating to Crimes and Misdemeanors Committed by Slaves, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes [hereinafter "1828 Act"].
Regardless of this different treatment under the substantive crimes, the same "rules and regulations" were to be applied at slave trials as were applied at the trials of free persons. DIGEST,
supra, tit. IV, ch. I, § 3, 1, p.542; 1828 Act § 60. It was also the duty of the court to assign
and appoint counsel to defend any slave being tried before it. DIGEST, supra,tit. IV, ch. I, § 3,
5, p.542; 1828 Act § 57. Thus, in 1845 the jury trial was given great-arguably more-protection
than some people (read slaves) received generally in the legal system.
In Luke, a Slave v. State, 5 Fla. 185 (1853), the court discussed-and with abhorrent language
approved-the statutory difference in penalties for crimes committed upon "any person" and
upon "slaves, free negroes, or mulattoes." However, the court made clear that the "humanity
of the law" can be preserved only by securing for the "degraded caste" the same procedural
protections claimed by whites-expressly including the right to trial by jury.
As discussed below, the legislature did allow a judge to override the automatic imposition of
death upon conviction of a slave for commission of one of five crimes. Because slaves were not
full citizens, and because the racially bifurcated development of the relevant statutory law
stopped after the Civil War, there is no need to explore the statutory development as applied to
these five crimes.
197. See Session Laws of Florida, Act of Sept. 17, 1822.
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and arson. The act used mandatory language, providing that any person committing the specified offenses "shall suffer death."'" Six years
later, the legislature added twelve crimes to the list of capital offenses
and, apparently for the first time, distinguished between crimes committed by white citizens and crimes committed by Black slaves or freed
people.'" Death was mandatory upon conviction of any one of five of
these twelve offenses; the other seven were punishable, at the court's
discretion, by death or a "lesser" penalty involving torture-whipping,
branding, or nailing of ears.3
Review of the statutory law extant in 1845 suggests that a jury decision for death was in effect a necessary condition for the imposition of
the death penalty. Capital punishment was for the most part mandatory
upon conviction of specified offenses. Capitalsentencing was the jury's
exclusive domain in the sense that jury consent was a condition precedent to death sentences. The court in no instance possessed the discretion to increase a jury's "recommended" lesser conviction/sentence to
death.
In 1845, Florida had ten crimes imposing a mandatory death penalty
applicable to any person regardless of race. See Table 2.

198. Id. at § 21 (emphasis added).
199. See supra note 195.
200. E.g., Session Laws of Florida, Act of November 21, 1838, §§ 19, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 36,
38, 39 & 56.
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TABLE 2
Mandatory Capital Offenses in 1845:
Applicable to Any Person Regardless of Race
Crime
Insurrection

Digest Citation

Statutory Citation

Digest, tit. I, ch. II,
2, p.490

1832 Act § 10.

Attempting to Excite
an Insurrection or Revolt of Slaves
Murder

Digest, tit. I, ch. II,
2, p.490

1832 Act § 10.

Digest, tit. I, ch.
III,
1, p. 4 9 0

1832 Act § 2.

Rape

Digest, tit. I, ch.
III, 1, p.490

1832 Act § 2.

Arson

Digest, tit. I, ch.
IV, 1, p.491

1832 Act § 2.

Slave Stealing

Digest, tit. I, ch.
IV, 6, p.492

1845 Act § 1.

Wilful Perjury Which
Causes the Life of
Another to be Taken
Away
Sodomy

Digest, tit. I, ch. V,
1, p.493

1832 Act § 17.

Digest, tit. I, ch.
VII, 11, p. 500

1842 Act § 1.

Digest, tit. I, ch.
XI, 7, p.506

1832 Act § 60.

Digest, tit. I, ch.
XI, 7, p.506

1832 Act § 60.

Wilfully Burning or
Making a Hole in Any
Ship Valued Above
$200.
Assisting in Making a
Hole in Any Ship Valued Above $200.

There were also twelve crimes imposing a mandatory death penalty
on any slave, free Black, or mulatto. See Table 3.
TABLE 3
Mandatory Capital Offenses in 1845:
Applicable to Slaves, Free Blacks and Mulattoes

Crime

Digest Citation

Statutory Citation

Conspiring to Insurrection

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 2, p.537

1828 Act § 34.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Conspiring to Murder
Assault and Battery of
a white Person with
Intent to Kill
Poisoning With Intent
to Kill
Manslaughter of a
white Person
Burning Any Dwelling-House, Store,
Cotton-House, Gin,
Mill, Outhouse, Barn,
or Stable
Accessory to Burning
Any Dwelling-House,
Store, Cotton-House,
Gin, Mill, Outhouse,
Barn, or Stable
Assault of white
Woman or Child with
Intent to Rape
Accessory to Assault
of white Woman or
Child with Intent to
Rape
Shooting at a white
Person With Intent to
Kill
Wilful or Malicious
Wounding of a white
Person While Attempting to Kill Another Person
Aiding and Abetting
the Wilful or Malicious Wounding of a
white Person While
Attempting to Kill
Another Person

[Vol. 18:923

IV, ch.
p.537
IV, ch.
p.537

1828 Act § 34.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 4, p.537
Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 5, p.537
Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 5, p.537

1828 Act § 36.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 5, p.537

1840 Act § 1.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § l, 6, p.538

1840 Act § 1.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 6, p.538

1840 Act § I.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 7, p.538

1828 Act § 55.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 7, p.538

1828 Act § 55.

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 7, p.538

1840 Act § 55.

Digest, tit.
I, § 1, 2,
Digest, tit.
I, § 1, 3,

1828 Act § 35.

1840 Act § 1.
1840 Act § 1.
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Additionally, five crimes imposed a mandatory death penalty upon
any slave, free Black, or mulatto, but allowed the court discretion to
impose alternate penalties if death was deemed inappropriate. See Table 4.
TABLE 4
Mandatory Capital Offenses in 1845:
Jury's Death Verdict Subject to
Judicial Override at Court's Discretion
Applicable to Slaves, Free Blacks and Mulattoes

Crime

Digest Citation

Statutory Citation

Robbery of the Person

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 8, p.538

1828 Act § 56. The alternate penalty was
having one's ears
nailed to posts and
standing for one hour
while receiving 39
lashes on the bare
back.

Burglary

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 8, p.538

1828 Act § 56. The alternate penalty was
having one's ears
nailed to posts and
standing for one hour
while receiving 39
lashes on the bare
back.

Maiming of a white
Person

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 9, p.538

1828 Act § 38 (as
amended by the 1840
Act § 3). The alternate penalties available were (a) being
whipped 39 stripes
and standing for one
hour with one's ears
nailed to posts, or (b)
having one's hand
burnt with a heated
iron in open court.
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Attempt to Commit
any Capital Offense

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 9, p.538

Accessory to Attempt
to Commit any Capital Offense

Digest, tit. IV, ch.
I, § 1, 9, p.538
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1828 Act § 38 (as
amended by the 1840
Act § 3). The alternate penalties available were (a) being
whipped 39 stripes
and standing for one
hour with one's ears
nailed to posts, or (b)
having one's hand
burnt with a heated
iron in open court.
1828 Act § 38 (as
amended by the 1840
Act § 3). The alternate penalties available were (a) being
whipped 39 stripes
and standing for one
hour with one's ears
nailed to posts, or (b)
having one's hand
burnt with a heated
iron in open court.

Thus, at the time that Florida's first constitution was ratified, a
jury's verdict of guilt of a capital crime meant that a death sentenceor in limited circumstances a lesser penalty-was mandatory. A jury's
verdict of death was a necessary, and usually a sufficient, condition of
imposition of capital punishment. This was the functional equivalent
of jury sentencing for capital offenses, at least for purposes of state
constitutional doctrine.
The nexus between the jury's verdict of guilt and its determination
of sentence was recognized by the Florida legislature in 1868, when it
enacted a statute providing that "no person whose opinions are such
as to preclude him [sic] from finding the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death shall be compelled or allowed to serve as a
juror on a trial of such an offense."' The Florida Supreme Court
applied this statute in Metzgar v. State,2 holding that it was "proper
to exclude from the jury in capital cases any person who, from scru-

201.
202.

The statute is quoted in Metzgar v. State, 18 Fla. 481, 486 (1881) (emphasis added).
Id. at 481.
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pies of conscience or some reason other than the want of sufficient
proof, would refuse to find a verdict of guilty." 23
Indeed, the fact that mandatory capital punishment was a jury matter led to the demise of mandatory capital punishment systems in the
United States. Mandatory sentencing obviously meant that the jury
could avoid the death penalty only by acquitting the defendant or
finding him or her guilty of a lesser offense. This threat of jury nullification encouraged the states to replace their mandatory death penalties with discretionary capital punishment laws. Some twenty-four
jurisdictions, including Florida, moved from mandatory to discretionary capital sentencing between the end of the Civil War and the turn
of the century.2
Capital punishment in Florida became discretionary during the
1870's-apparently in 1872.2 By 1884 the Florida Supreme Court was
able to state that "the law is positive. If a majority of the jurors recommend to mercy, by whatever motives they may be actuated (and
these motives are not circumscribed) the court is bound to heed their
verdict and pronounce sentence accordingly. ' " This remained the
law of Florida until Furman v. Georgia invalidated every jurisdiction's capital statute, including Florida's.w Thus, for the century before Furman v. Georgia-1872 to 1972-a Florida jury's verdict for
life was clearly and explicitly and unquestionably final.
Florida's jury trial doctrine requires a determination of whether the
right existed as to capital sentencing in 1845. History provides no definitive answer here, but doctrine requires that an answer be forced
from the mists of the past. Although the historical record is somwhat
sketchy, the practical reality appears to have been that in 1845 juries
in Florida were the capital sentencers ifanyone was. It cannot be argued credibly that judges sentenced capitally during this period. The
judge was required to sentence to death or less upon a jury's verdict
of guilty. In no situation was the judge authorized to increase a jury's
verdict/sentence to death.

203. Id.
204. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292 (1976).
205. The syllabus in Keech v. State, 15 Fla. 391, 391 (1876), cited the "Act of February 27,
1872, ch. 1887," for the proposition that "in 'capital' cases, if a majority of the jury recommended the accused to the mercy of the court, the sentence must be imprisonment for life;" see
also id. at 407; Metzgar v. State, 18 Fla. 482, 483 (1881). Bowers also identified 1872 as the year
Florida moved from mandatory to discretionary capital sentencing. W. BowERS, supra note 2,at
10-11.
206. Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 101 (1884); see also Garner v. State, 9 So. 835, 847 (Fla.
1891).
207. See discussion supra notes 55-62, 205-06 and accompanying text.
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History seldom offers definitive answers. But given that Florida's
jury trial doctrine requires that the vagaries of history resolve the jury
trial constitutional inquiry, Florida's history as of 1845 suggests that
juries were the capital sentencers in Florida at that time. The doctrinal
fiction is that somebody was: judge or jury. It clearly was not the
judge. By process of elimination, it was the jury-if it was anyone.
Because the right to jury sentencing in capital cases existed in 1845, it
remains inviolate today. Florida's statutory provision that permits
judges to impose death notwithstanding a jury's "recommendation"
of life therefore seems to violate the state constitution.
V.

CONCLUSION

I trust jurors. I trust them if they vote for mercy or for death.
Florida Governor Lawton Chiles 2°8
Existing state constitutional law supports the idea that the jury
override offends the state constitution. Florida's override was the
product of federal constitutional confusion, and its history in practice
has not been a happy one. Even applying the corset of history embodied in the Florida Supreme Court's jury trial cases, the jury override is
vulnerable to state constitutional challenge.
The historical record provides space sufficient to support or invalidate the override, although on balance history weighs in on the side of
invalidation. Ancient Florida history, circa 1845, suggests that jury
verdicts for life were final. A century of "modern" history, from
1872 to the present, shows why jury verdicts for life should be final. 2°9
Only Florida's understandable misconception of Furman indicated
otherwise, but now we know better. It would be poetically fitting for
the Florida Supreme Court to repudiate the override as offensive to
Florida's history-and its constitutional values past and present. Because it is offensive. In this age of deregulated death at the federal
level, only the Florida Supreme Court can say that it is offensive.

208.
209.

MacGarrahan, supra note 80, at 6B.
Mello & Robson, supra note 7; Radelet, supra note 70; Radelet & Vandiver, supra note

